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Luxembourg Institute for European
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Summer Course

"The Role of the EU in the European Security System"

24-26 July 2006

Odessa, Ukraine

Introduction

In association with the I. Mechnikov National University (Odessa), the Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies (LIEIS) organised a summer course on "The role of the EU in the European security system" on 24-26 July 2006 in Odessa, Ukraine. About 25 participants from Georgia, Russia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia and the Ukraine, as well as three speakers from Western Europe debated the evolution of the European integration process and the desirability and feasibility of a common security and defence strategy. The discussions also touched on the potential and limits of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as well as shared initiatives in the area of defence policy such as the Franco-German Euro-Corps.

According to Armand Clesse, Director of the LIEIS, the main topic of this summer course referred to something which does not as yet exist and might never come into being – a common security and defence strategy at the EU level. One main reason for the absence of such a strategy at present is the disconnection between the economic and the political dimension of the European integration process. Indeed, ever since the French rejection of the European Defence Community on 30 August 1954 and the concomitant failure to establish the European Political Union, the emphasis was on more pragmatic policy areas. The functional approach which was adopted and followed for several decades was at the expense of more visionary projects. This legacy endures to this day: whereas the creation of the single market and the introduction of the Euro have brought economic integration to near completion, in the security and defence field little, if any, progress has been achieved. The political process is in an impasse or perhaps even at a dead end.

21 rue Philippe II - L-2340 Luxembourg
Tel. (00352) 466580 - Fax (00352) 466579
e-mail: armand.clesse@ieis.lu - URL: http://www.ieis.lu

A number of fundamental questions can thus be raised. First, is the EU willing and able to set up a genuinely common foreign, security and defence policy? Secondly, would such a policy be consonant with the real ambitions of the EU? What are those ambitions, in the wake of Eastern enlargement and the Constitutional Treaty? Thirdly, can the vastly heterogeneous Union achieve any true sense of cohesion and political unity or is a shared 'political culture' a utopia or, worse, an illusion and self-delusion?

It has been argued for a long time that the Franco-German axis was the engine of the integration dynamic from the 1950s until the creation of the Eurozone and Eastern enlargement. Do we need a new functional equivalent that can kick-start the process which has been at a standstill since last year's rejection of the Constitution by France and the Netherlands? There is now an official rethinking going on – a 'reflection period' which next year under the auspices of the German Presidency might lead to a new document setting out institutional reforms. Among the many factors and challenges ahead, there is not only an increasing degree and scope of heterogeneity and diversity that could lead to more, not less, divergence, but also a growing sense of disillusionment and alienation in the new member-states, especially Poland. The ongoing debate opposes those who want to take bold moves and create a political Union to those who advocate pragmatism and incremental change. This raises the question of the finality of the integration and enlargement process: common rules, shared norms, perhaps even a 'community of destiny' and something like a 'we-feeling'?

In order to enable a frank exchange of views and to provide a framework for formulating fresh ideas, three working groups were set up and charged to draw up short reports that summarise the findings of the discussions which were organised and led by the participants themselves. The topics of the three working groups were as follows:

(1) What is the ultimate purpose of the Union?

(2) What are the foundations of the Union?

(3) What should be the configuration of the Union by 2050?

The three-day summer school consisted of plenary discussions during three hours every morning and for two hours after lunch, followed by meetings of the working groups in the late afternoon. On the last day of the summer course, the *rapporteurs* from the three groups presented the main findings. A brief discussion concluded the two and a half days.

I. The state of the European Union and the challenges ahead

The first part of the summer course was devoted to an extensive analysis of the current state of the EU and the main challenges and problems which it faces at present and in future. A. Clesse argued that member-states have tended to misuse and abuse the ongoing European debate for national political considerations. Even in Luxembourg which has traditionally been among the most pro-European countries, the debate in the run-up to the referendum on the Constitution became increasingly parochial and national. This is related to the question of the EU's 'democratic deficit' and reflections on how to overcome it. President Chirac thought that

he could achieve an easy victory and thereby improve his national ratings. Similarly, most citizens in the 25 member-states are fed up with enlargement, and any referendum on Romania and Bulgaria would yield a negative result – in many countries the opposition to more new members is as high as ¾ of the whole population. The EU is in a state of paralysis and no one, whether in Brussels or the national capitals, has any real idea of how to re-launch and reinvigorate the political process. Some countries such as the Northern member-states, Britain and others believe that enlargement is both vital and indispensable for further progress, but this is neither theoretically nor empirically verified.

Federalism, functionalism and neo-functionalism are part of conceptualisations and debates long past. There is also the intellectual dimension – there is a lack of creative theoretical thinking which goes beyond these and other theories that were first systematised in the 1950s. Ideology, values and perceptions are banned from the official discussions. But this is wrong. Instead, they could and should to be highlighted in debates that seek to make a difference rather than perpetuating the *status quo*. Such debates should be about critical thinking in order to change conceptualisations and challenge conventional ideas. The lack of critical thinking in parts of Central and Eastern Europe is shocking. What is important is to question the current consensus, the prevailing model, and not to portray the EU or the USA as the only way towards salvation.

These introductory remarks led to a discussion on some of the principal challenges which the EU is facing or will face in the medium and long term. Among the students, there was a large consensus that ethnic and cultural diversity is a precious resource for the Union as a whole but a source of tension and conflict between and within member-states too. This is enhanced and compounded by immigration and the concomitant problems related to integration. Demography was identified as another key challenge, especially the low birth rates across the Union, including in Southern and Eastern countries where religion and other factors have traditionally favoured extended families. Diversity and demography are of course intimately intertwined. Some students argued that migratory flows could undermine the emerging common identity but they conceded that immigration can under certain circumstances be a successful solution to low birth rates and population decline.

According to other students, the delicate balance between supranational power and national sovereignty will continue to be a major problem for the EU. In order to respond to these and other challenges, the Union needs to confront the question of whether it is desirable and feasible to construct a shared civic and political identity and how to translate such an identity in 'high politics', especially a common foreign, security and defence policy. Some students questioned the ability of the EU to agree on strategic goals, given the divergence over the proposed Constitutional Treaty. Others wondered whether the lack of natural resources and economic growth might not prevent agreement on shared objectives and thwart the implementation of common policies in key strategic areas such as 'energy security'.

There was also one student who denied that Europe faces any serious challenges because it is composed of first-world countries that are rich and whose model is emulated by poorer third-world countries. Another student proclaimed his utter indifference towards EU affairs and said only to be interested in the USA and the American way of life. Confronted with questions about the rationale of their positions, both students failed to give any intelligible explanation or provide any coherent arguments. As a result of their negative attitude and their lack of

critical reflection, their contributions to the remaining sessions of the summer course were destructive and disappointing.

However, most students showed interest in the topics of the successive sessions and participated actively. Some students insisted on the need to distinguish between different challenges for different sectors of European society. Elites and government face distinct challenges compared with ordinary citizens. Indeed, many nation-states are faced with an 'identity crisis' and the EU as a whole is threatened by a 'democratic deficit'. By contrast, many citizens are confronted with socio-economic insecurity and are alienated from the prevailing culture. In general, challenges are not identical because they are a function of interests and priorities which vary across different groups.

One student drew the distinction between polity and policy. This distinction concerns strategy on the one hand, and policy-making and implementation on the other hand. It also touches on the internal and external dimension of the EU, European-wide security questions as opposed to international security questions, vis-à-vis other parts of the world, in particular regional blocs in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Perhaps the main challenge of the EU is whether it is appropriate and sustainable to project one and the same model onto its own diverse parts and the rest of the world.

Finally, some students developed some ideas about how to address and overcome some of these challenges. Faced with a lack of identity and democracy, the EU could decide to form a European government that brings together the Commission and the Council and is elected by the European Parliament. Another idea was to privilege common EU-wide action over separate national debates. A third idea concerned the relation between the EU and NATO: rather than focusing on NATO enlargement, would not EU initiatives in the field of security and defence offer a perspective to non-members and also benefit the EU countries themselves? More generally, in order to balance unity and diversity, the EU requires a new account of the relation between the unification of the EU and the regionalisation within the Union and its member-states.

In response to this discussion, Christopher Coker, Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, contended that terms such as 'identity' and 'civilisation' tend not to be used by Western Europeans. Moreover, the current talk of 'crisis' needs to be qualified. As the German nineteenth-century philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche said, 'what does not kill me makes me stronger'. Thus, the EU could be strengthened if it overcomes the current impasse and addresses the profound challenges which threaten its existence and operation. Rather than to subscribe to the idea of an imminent apocalypse which will lead to the inevitable demise of Europe, it is preferable to describe and to define the current crisis in terms of a lack or absence of criteria and the loss of common paradigms. As Thomas Kuhn argued, paradigms are not objective standards of truth but instead are more akin to worldviews. What Europe has lost is a consensus on the meaning of European integration and enlargement, the foundations and the finalities of this twin process. Consequently, questions such as whether Turkey should or should not be admitted are addressed almost exclusively on the basis of subjective opinions, not objective factors. Europe lacks a shared self-understanding and a common conceptuality.

According to this sense of crisis, the EU faces three principal challenges: first, a 'demographic deficit'; secondly, a 'democratic deficit' and, thirdly, a 'civic or citizenship deficit'. Europe has a 'demographic deficit' because it is failing to reproduce itself. By contrast, the USA will double its population by the year 2100. However, Europe has to cope with the demographic pressure stemming from Islam because population growth is predominantly the result of immigration and 95% of immigrants are Muslims. The American commentator Mark Steyn has compared Europeans to the Shakers: in an opinion piece on 22 March 2005 in the *Daily Telegraph*, he wrote that "The 19th-century Shaker communities were forbidden from breeding and could increase their number only by conversion". So, C. Coker argued that in order to survive, Europe must 'convert' the immigrants to its values and way of life. But this is complicated by the absence of religion from public life in most countries in Europe. In the Czech Republic, over 50% of the population declare that they do not belong to any religion. In Britain, Church attendance has reached a new record low and now stands at 4% of the total population. Indeed, already today 32% of people who confess their religious faith in the UK are Muslim. At once the most tolerant and the most intolerant Muslims in Europe live in Britain. It is estimated that as many as 140 million migrants are heading towards Europe. Their peaceful conversion to European values and their integration into European societal life constitute an unprecedented challenge.

Europe's 'democratic deficit' is not so much the result of a blurred separation of powers and the absence of a proper European government; rather, the nature and operation of democracy is evolving: democracy is going online, it is becoming increasingly single-issue, and it takes the form of advocacy and focus groups. At the same time, party politics is all but disappearing, and with it popular democracy as we have known it in the post-Second World War era. For instance, in the UK the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds alone has more members than all the major political parties combined. Moreover, there is no European *demos* and thus there is no European ethos. As a result, it is impossible to speak of shared norms, even though values can be said to be common across the EU.

Finally, Europe has a 'citizenship deficit', in the sense that Europeans share certain rights of movement and work, incorporated into national law, but they do not share a common idea of what a European citizen is or ought to be. This is true both internally and externally. In many ways, Europe is emulated as a model of trans-regional integration by other political blocs in the world, but this is fast changing. Even though observers like Mark Leonard speak of the phenomenon of 'syndicating European values' (in order to respond to the threats that have beset the prevailing global governance model), China has already replaced the EU as the first donor of so-called 'third-world aid'. In consequence, the Chinese model is gaining the upper hand and this model neither requires security guarantees (as does the American model), nor does it impose a certain type of global governance, human rights and corruption (as does the EU). In conclusion, the European model is obsolete, certainly the economic dimension of it, and there are no signs of revival.

A. Clesse disagreed with this analysis and contended that forecasts such as population projection are all but meaningless because they cannot by definition allow for unpredictable events like the impact of 9/11 on immigration, the trajectory of the US economy or US policies along the Mexican border. For example, the latest developments in the USA indicate rising levels of xenophobia and racism, as indicated by the sharp decline of foreign students coming to American universities. Moreover, with the exception of the Ivy League universities

such as Harvard, Yale and Stanford, the American education system is a disaster, at all levels, primary, secondary and tertiary. Furthermore, Chinese growth rates might well not be sustainable, if demands for more rights and more protection rise in line with increasing wealth. In response to these objections, C. Coker said that forecasts are real in the sense that they do shape debates and influence policies, including the five-year plans which are now widely and wildly adopted by Western governments, in particular Britain. Indeed, under the reign of Tony Blair, the British state has been recast as a service provider which must deliver on predetermined standards and targets. Forecasts are crucial to the dominant ideology which purports to be pragmatic and oriented towards effective delivery within specified time spans.

Regarding immigration, C. Coker distinguished between the American and the European approach. In the USA, immigration is by far the biggest fear; there is widespread apprehension of the 'ethnic stranger', hollowing out the WASP mentality. This is the vision of Samuel Huntington, as expressed in his most recent book *Who Are We?* Likewise, Edward Luttwak has spoken of the 'third-worldization' of the USA as a result of importing cheap labour. By contrast, the European fear of immigrants is not ethnic, but ethical – the 'ethical stranger', estranged from the social contract, a stranger who rejoices in this estrangement and thus undermines the common cultural, political and social fabric. As for the rise of China, it is more a restoration of its previous status than a historical novelty. Indeed, China might go back to where it has always been, i.e. the first economic power – a position which (according to many recent estimates) it enjoyed until the 18th century, when it was overtaken by Britain, which in turn was overtaken by the USA in about 1880.

Asked about what the assimilation or conversion of immigrants means and why religion might matter to the present and future of Europe, C. Coker responded by asking whether a post-metaphysical Europe is genuinely viable. The 'problem' is not so much what to do with second- and third-generation immigrants but what to do with first-generation immigrants who arrive on the shores of Europe, many of whom are detained on the Italian island of Lampedusa in conditions akin to those at Guantánamo Bay. The arrival of Muslim immigrants raises two specific questions. First, in terms of security, how to prevent home-grown suicide bombers? Secondly, how to combine the aggressive secularism of Britain with the persistence of religious faith and practices among immigrant communities (a problem which the USA does not face because it is not secular). Moreover, the reaction against domestic and foreign policy further leads to alienation of young Muslims in Britain and there as elsewhere this could lead to parallel societies (e.g. parallel legal systems, secular and *sha'ria*). In response to questions about existing diversity and the presence of religion in Europe, he said that the secular nation-state is still the prevailing force. This explains why wearing the head-scarf and ensuring universal public education are deemed incompatible in countries such as France. At the same time, it is very difficult to construct a shared European identity on the ruins of national identities. He also argued that it was the Enlightenment which had given rise to political religions like Marxism and liberalism and that the death of these political religions marks the death of metaphysical beliefs. The question is whether a European political union can dispense with such beliefs and, if not, how to identify common foundations which overcome the end of metaphysics and go beyond the empty liberal rhetoric of human rights and the rule of law.

Adrian Pabst, Research Fellow at the LIEIS, argued that the current world order is neither inevitable nor sustainable. The Cold War was not so much won by the West as it ended with

the implosion of the Soviet system and the peaceful disarmament initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev. America preserved its status as superpower by default and not because its model had triumphed across the world. At present, the USA remains the only global superpower but under George W. Bush, it can hardly be said to be a force for good. The attempt to convert to democracy the Middle East and other regions of the world has manifestly failed. Neither 'shock-and-awe' like in Afghanistan and Iraq nor orchestrated regime change via 'people power' in Georgia and the Ukraine has delivered the purported objective of securing the world through democratisation. Instead, it has led to further instability and violence. Moreover, American power is already declining, economically, politically and, perhaps more importantly, culturally. Even though the 'American way of life' is expanding to far-flung corners of the world as a result of global capitalism, it is meeting growing resistance, above all on the part of the Muslim world, in Latin America and parts of Asia. At the same time, China's role in the international system is primarily economic – it offers markets for consumer goods and services, and it provides aid to increasingly many developing countries. But China's civilisation tends almost exclusively to be introspective and targeted at the Han Chinese and the Chinese homeland (including, of course, Taiwan). The current Chinese regime is likely to focus on the social situation at home and on economic opportunities abroad; it has not so far shown any signs of offering an alternative political order.

As such, only Europe can offer a political and cultural alternative to US hegemony, said A. Pabst. The specificity of the 'European model' is social – both the historic comprise between capital and labour and the role of intermediary institutions that mediate between the state and the market are two distinctly European inventions. Most importantly, Europe has a long tradition of the peaceful coexistence of the three monotheistic faiths. This is an invaluable cultural heritage and a powerful political asset in order to surmount current and future conflicts, within Europe and across the globe. With the exception of aggressively secular regimes like France and Turkey, the mark of religion in Europe is a certain middle ground – between and beyond theocratic Puritans (whether radical Calvinism or Sunni Wahhabism) and secular liberals. This is not to deny the religious conflicts that have marred European history or the contemporary secularisation of Europe as a whole. But there is another tradition which can be preserved and extended, that of civic virtues. Civic virtues encompass ethical limits on warfare, codes of honour, a sense of excelling in intellectual and practical activities out of a sense of duty, as well as practices that seek the 'common good' and the 'good life'. The challenge is how to revive this tradition and adapt to current needs. Without such a cultural and political vision, Europe's current crisis will turn into a lasting stagnation, regression and perhaps even an irreversible decline.

II. The European security conundrum and Europe as a defence and/or security community

During the second part of the summer course, the discussion moved away from the present state of the EU and the future challenges and moved towards questions more directly related to security and defence. The focus was on the European security conundrum and on Europe as a defence and/or security community. In his introductory remarks, A. Clesse criticised the modalities of Eastern enlargement and lamented the absence of any coherent security or defence strategy in the EU. Enlargement was a unilateral move to bring the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in line with the norms and standards of the existing member-

states. Whether a friendly takeover or a colonialist policy, the truth is that no one at the EU or the national level asked what the new countries could contribute to the Union. In this sense, EU enlargement was not unlike German reunification, when the Federal Republic swallowed the GDR and imposed its system. Unsurprisingly, the costs were exorbitant and increasingly many Western Germans have come to regret the ensuing fiscal bill. Of course, German reunification and EU Eastern enlargement have had positive effects, for example improving efficiency and eliminating many forms of corruption. However, the overriding assumption was that the prevailing model was the only desirable one, ignoring systemic failure and the urgent need to address structural problems, including the decline of culture and knowledge.

The main objection which A. Clesse raised against the way enlargement policy was conducted is that if the current stagnation goes on, then it will inevitably be blamed on the Union and thereby increase the already existing 'Euro-fatigue'. The EU's own approach will have been both dysfunctional and counterproductive. If confirmed, this trajectory will have important repercussions for security and defence policy: will the EU member-states, both 'old' and 'new', deem a common strategy desirable? If so, will it be feasible? Does the EU need such a dimension for the entire process or undertaking? Can – indeed should – the Union dispense with such and similar projects?

Historically, there were attempts to establish a European defence identity at significant moments such as the 1948 Berlin blockade and the Korean War in the early 1950s. Most important of all were the French initiatives to create a European Defence Community (EDC) and a European Political Union. At that time, these initiatives were shaped by the internal context (keeping German ambitions at bay and containing the Soviet Union) and the external context (the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu and the 'Dulles doctrine' to prevent the rise of Europe as a global power). One of the main lessons from the failure of the EDC is the need to act swiftly and decisively, as had earlier been done in the case of the European Coal and Steel Community. But although this triggered a process which culminated in the 1957 Rome Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), political unification and a common defence had *de facto* been abandoned. Instead, Europe was confined to being a regional actor and the junior partner of the USA. This was based on the concept of 'balanced collective forces', according to which Europe had to provide the bulk of armed forces and leave "massive retaliation" to the USA (as a lesson of the Korean War and in view of possible nuclear acts by the Soviet Union).

What this brief survey of European history reveals is the limit on European military capability. It also raises the question of whether we need nuclear weapons, and how Europeans should participate in the debate on the modernisation of the British Trident and the French nuclear system. In any case, an independent European nuclear force would necessitate a strong political base, most probably a President with extensive powers. In turn, this requires a debate on whether Europe already is something like a community of fate (*Schicksalsgemeinschaft*) which would be able to agree on and establish a European security and defence strategy. There are those who think Europe should only be a civilian power, whereas others argue that it requires a defence capability independently of NATO.

Following these remarks, C. Coker argued that it was François Duchêne, a closer adviser to Jean Monnet, who first described Europe as a civilian power (alongside Japan) because only superpowers are military powers. Today, the question is whether you can be a civilian power

without underwriting civic values with a capability to secure and enforce them in a situation of large-scale violence and military conflict. Europe has translated its civilian ethos into the military realm, as it refuses to deploy landmines, cluster bombs and phosphorus. As such, there are stark differences between the USA and Europe in terms of whether and how wars are waged. This extends to Britain, America's closest ally in Europe. Indeed, as General Mike Jackson, the Chief of Defence Staff, has recently argued, the UK and the USA have markedly different 'military cultures'.

But this does not make Europe a coherent and homogeneous defence or security community. In terms of defence, there is a divergence between those countries which see their armies exclusively as 'peace-keeping forces' (the Nordic countries and Germany) and those which continue to deploy their armies for interventions and war (the UK and France). For example, the military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was the first European war (despite the involvement of the USA via NATO), but some politicians like the then German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer described it as *Friedenspolitik*. In the realm of defence policy, there are no 'convergence criteria' which would enable the EU to move to a common defence strategy. This inability is compounded by the difference between a conscript and a professional army. As for a European security community, the historical aim to prevent France and Germany from going to war against each other has been achieved. Nowadays Europe tends to export security to its 'near-abroad', but it does not play a global role, as evinced by its failure to make a genuine difference to international conflicts such as the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian war.

A. Pabst contended that France and Britain must be blamed for the recent failure to set up a common European defence and security strategy. Just like the economic integration process required the Franco-German axis, integration in the geopolitical area of security and defence needs Franco-British leadership because Britain and France are the only European countries which have a proper military capability, in particular nuclear weapons and large armies. This is why the Summit meeting between President Chirac and Prime Minister Blair in December 1998 in St. Malo was a historic chance which raised expectations which were ultimately squandered. The reason was the French inability to see Europe as anything other than an extension of itself and the British unwillingness to question its 'special relations' with America. Not only has Tony Blair repeatedly failed to influence George W. Bush, but the Iraq adventure has caused a profound rift within the EU from which it may not recover any time soon. If Britain were prepared to shift its allegiance from the USA to Europe and if France could think beyond the Hexagon, then a European defence and security community would be a distinct possibility.

These short presentations led to a debate on the relation between a common foreign policy on the one hand and a shared security and defence identity on the other hand. One student referred to Benjamin Disraeli who famously said that there are neither permanent enemies nor permanent friends but only permanent interests. What might Europe's 'permanent interests' be and how best to defend them? Does this require a military capability or is 'soft civilian power' sufficient? Other students mentioned the case of Japan which has a pacifist constitution but has traditionally been a militaristic country based on an aggressive nationalism which is feared in Asia. In this context, C. Coker remarked that Japan has a military ethos which bears the name 'Bushido', the philosophy of the Samurai.

A. Clesse then refocused the debate from wider international questions to European matters. He wondered about the perception of threats in Europe today and said that many countries in Central and Eastern Europe continue to view Russia as an imminent danger to their territorial and political integrity. One exception is Belarus, which was described as the embodiment of the neo-Soviet project and a natural ally of Russia. However, it was also argued that Belarus views Russia as a provider of vital resources and as a strategic ally, but not as a cultural partner or friend. Rather, Belarus is isolated and has no intention of forming a state union with Russia.

C. Coker argued that Europe has traditionally operated on the basis of conventional and nuclear threats but by contrast NATO now talks the language of risks. Threats are to some extent objectively real, whereas risks are subjectively perceived. This is important because it indicates the absence of any actuary criteria by which to measure the reality of risks. The Cold War was largely fought on paper because it was a matter of conventional forces and nuclear threats which could be estimated and calculated. All intelligence scoops were not the result of the excellence of Western espionage but instead the defection of Soviet spies who reported on the military capability of the USSR. However, this is not true for threats stemming from environmental degradation, terrorism or transnational organised crime. Today, the so-called 'war on terror' is a matter of opinion and conjecture. There is and can be no empirical evidence on the reality of terrorist threats. In consequence, any serious statistical support for different positions is absent. Moreover, there are two phenomena which complicate the analysis of risks. First, 'unintended consequences', above all caused by environmental degradation. Incidentally, this term was coined by Karl Marx with reference to changes in the nineteenth-century textile industry. Secondly, 'boomerang effect' or 'blow-back', i.e. the threat posed by groups which received backing in the past and now turn against their former master, e.g. the Taleban and Al-Qaeda who had been supported by the USA during the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Both phenomena cannot be ignored but instead require 'consequence management' which poses new threats, as evinced by the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq in the wake of 9/11.

In response to these ideas, A. Pabst argued that the distinction between threats and risks is predicated on the more fundamental replacement of objectivity with subjectivity. Instead of giving a descriptive account of the world, late modern or post-modern politics tends to privilege the projection of subjective emotions or opinions onto reality. These projections are thought to be more real and acquire a life on their own. This consecrates the emergence of a 'virtual reality' in which computer simulation takes precedence over genuine territorial expertise. For instance, after 9/11 the US State Department abolished a number of regional desks that had previously been staffed with experts who had extensive experience of key regions and countries like the Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Instead of drawing on such experience, US policy was formulated according to computer-generated calculations and calibrations. Once the prevailing neo-conservative ideology had decided to invade Iraq based on the alleged threat of WMDs, all contrary evidence was discarded and the media was fed biased data which supported the case for military action. The only alternative to this evolution is to reject the dualism between subjectivity and objectivity and to restore the relation between the two. Against the backdrop of Islamic terrorism and Evangelical extremism, it is crucial to recover objective universal values and standards which are neither purely secular nor exclusively religious. Instead, what is required is a political and civic middle ground where

rival positions can engage in a true contest for the 'common good' and the 'good life', above and beyond ideological posture and sectional interest.

According to C. Coker, one effect of substituting subjective risks for objective threats is to proclaim the death of knowledge and to inaugurate the rise of experts. Indeed, as Anthony Giddens said, contemporary political debates are characterised by the opposition between the 'guardians of knowledge' and self-appointed 'experts' (e.g. doctors *vs*. support groups). This has also affected academia and journalism, as increasingly many researchers and commentators write books for the 'chattering classes' and the 'nattering nabobs of negativism' (Spiro Agnew, US Vice-President under President Nixon). On US hegemony, he argued that it is necessary to draw the distinction between 'soft' and 'hard' Wilsonians. The 'soft' Wilsonians promote democracy throughout the world in order to secure the USA. The 'hard' Wilsonians go beyond the promotion of democracy and freedom and in addition seek imperial territorialisation. The adjective 'imperial' contrasts with 'imperialist', according to Raymond Aron who described both the USA and the Soviet as military superpowers: the former was imperial and had sufficient power to adapt to global as well as local circumstances, whereas the latter was imperialist and had to intervene militarily because of a fear of weakness. Nowadays, this difference translates into 'soft' and 'hard' neo-cons: the former advocate retrenchment, while the latter call for an attack on Iran.

A. Clesse concluded the second part of the summer course by adding that we are witnessing a brutalisation of American society which is now being spread across the globe, as documented by Abu Ghraib, Bagram airbase, the massacres at Haditha and elsewhere. George W. Bush has single-handedly destroyed the image of the USA in the world. The real question is who in America is challenging this hegemonic stance. Where is the American civil society protesting against the abhorrent practices at Guantánamo Bay?

III. Relations of the EU with the 'wider Europe' and the EU as a international strategic actor

The third part of the summer course analysed the relations between the EU and non-members in the wider Europe as well as the potential and limits of the EU as an international strategic actor. The discussions were divided into three parts: first, a plenary debate on some of the key problems and alternatives; secondly, the presentation of the findings of the working groups; thirdly, a lively exchange of ideas which concluded the summer course.

In his preliminary remarks, A. Clesse raised a number of fundamental questions. First, do all countries in Eastern Europe want to join the EU? What about NATO? Which countries in the Caucasus count on the EU and the USA for their long-term security? He wondered whether there is not an 'enlargement fatigue' in the EU and whether this fatigue does not *de facto* rule out any realistic chance for countries other than Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia to accede to the EU in the foreseeable future. As a result, Turkey, the Ukraine and other countries in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe have practically no hope of joining in the next 20-30 years. When the ruling elites in Brussels and the national capitals promise further waves of enlargement, it is hard not to see the hypocrisy and double-talk which are at work. Moreover, the so-called Copenhagen criteria are applied in such a way as to foreclose the possibility of dealing with countries like Serbia or Belarus. At the same time, the West is content to deal

with regimes that are clearly not democratic. The 'double standards' that are applied by the EU and its member-states tend to question and to undermine the entire undertaking of enlargement and the 'new neighbourhood' policy.

These remarks led to a vigorous debate. Some students concurred with this vision and said that the EU is viewed with suspicion from outside because it is arrogant and imposes conditions for negotiations unilaterally. What is required instead is a true pan-European dispensation, not unlike Mikhail Gorbachev's vision of a 'common European house'. Other students disagreed and advocated a full integration of Eastern European countries into the political and security structures of the West, beginning with NATO membership. This is because NATO is seen as the only viable organisation to provide real security guarantees against the continued threat posed by Russia. This threat is real because Russia still thinks in terms of 'natural spheres of influence' into which Europe is carved up – Russia claims a monopoly on the Eastern part of Europe and seeks to create a Russian protectorate for allies such as Belarus and regions loyal to Moscow (such as the 'frozen conflicts' of Abkhazia, Transnistria and Southern Ossetia). How else can one explain the anti-Russian sentiments and the repeated 'colour revolutions' that have taken place in the post-Soviet space over the last three years or so?

Yet other students cautioned against generalisations and conceptual confusion. They urged all the participants to be clear about terminology and concepts. For instance, the Caucasus does not mean much to the people from the countries which are supposed to belong to it. Instead, there are markedly different identities in countries like Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Religious, ethnic and tribal ties are much more important than geographical location. Identities are multi-faceted and not mutually exclusive: the so-called Caucasian countries consider themselves to be equally part of the Middle East and Europe.

In the light of these comments, C. Coker argued that the EU operates like the Roman Empire, in the sense of trying to 'civilise' hitherto chaotic, inefficient and violent societies by bringing them into its fold. Like the Roman Empire, the EU's 'absorption capacity' is not unlimited. Once it will have been exhausted, the EU will offer partnerships and thus keep potential candidate countries at bay. A. Pabst echoed this view and said that the current model of enlargement is not mutually beneficial. The imposition of the *acquis communautaire* – more than 80,000 pages of Community legislation – destroys existing economic capacity and causes extensive social costs. The centralising force of the common market in its present configuration undermines local economies and accelerates the concentration of economic and political power in the hands of small elites. Prior to any further enlargement, what is required is an unprecedented decentralisation of the entire EU and each member-states. This is an absolute precondition for any successful integration of new countries. A genuine decentralisation would constitute the sort of structural transformation that would empower local communities and enable a differentiated strategy of development. At the same time, the EU must abandon its claim to embody the whole of Europe. Instead, it should form an alliance with the other main powers in Europe, above all Russia, the Ukraine and Turkey. Only a greater Europe which exceeds the EU and is based on a proper political and strategic vision can hope to be a global actor and play an autonomous role on the international stage.

Following this debate, the three working groups presented the findings of their discussions (cf. reports in Appendix). The summer course then concluded with a final plenary session. A.

Clesse contrasted two fundamentally different tendencies that may cause further divergence between the EU and non-members in Europe. On the one hand, the EU promotes a common model of development that entails a high degree of homogenisation. The operation of the common market and the functioning of the Community institutions tend to favour economic and social uniformity. On the other hand, there are aspects of societal life in Central and Eastern Europe that cause and enhance fragmentation, corruption and the loss of social cohesion. The phenomenon of fragmentation has traditionally been termed 'Balkanisation', but the reality is much more complex. For example, in the case of Serbia it is more appropriate to speak of 'shrinking' rather than fragmentation because the country is being carved up, a process which concerns Kosovo, Montenegro and perhaps in the future the region of Vojvodina.

Some of the students said that the EU and the non-members are each more divided than might be apparent. Within the EU, there is absolutely no consensus at all on integration and enlargement. Instead, increasingly many countries seek to pursue their narrow national interests – if necessary at the expense of the Union as a whole. In the East, there are those countries which favour membership in Western structures (NATO and the EU) and those which want to maintain close relations with Russia, the CIS and other Eastern powers and organisations. Other students argued that these tendencies will reinforce divergence and division. If the EU wants to be equal to its own ambitions of being a regional power and a global actor, then it must restore coherence and consistence between the East and the West. For the non-members in the East, this means an unequivocal commitment to Europe and the renunciation of nationalism. For the EU, it means setting even higher standards for its members and meeting them before lecturing others on democracy, freedom and the rule of law.

C. Coker reverted to the topic of Europe as a 'civilising force'. He remarked that in 1204, there were two sorts of barbarians – those on horseback who arrived via the Eurasian steps and those who arrived by sea and sacked Constantinople. Civility is not an absolute objective value but rather a matter of perspective. It raises questions about the ability to assimilate the stranger and forge a cohesive entity. At present, Europeans seem both unwilling and unable to assimilate immigrants. This is already causing social tensions and will continue to undermine social and political cohesion. Moreover, the EU has not only preserved the nation-state but in fact extended it by enhancing sovereignty: it is a trans-national state, which may or may not be un-democratic but which remains a state based on the idea of sovereignty. Unless and until it becomes something else, the EU will not escape the fundamental tension and conflict between national and European-wide interests and competencies. Furthermore, the Union is suffering the consequences of its own success. Power has shifted from the Social-Democratic and Christian-Democratic traditional elite to a new self-selecting, self-reproducing elite that is socialised by the European institutions rather than shaping them. As a result, the EU is incapable of structural reform and a profound overhaul of its institutions. This perpetuates the *status quo* and prevents the emergence of true alternatives.

More fundamentally, the challenge which Europe faces is whether it can recover and re-enact a certain ethos that complements the law and facilitates self-regulation. Even though corruption tends to be lower in the EU than in many non-members, there are certain forms of corruption that are endemic, especially nepotism and an utter lack of striving for excellence out of a sense of duty rather than legal requirement. As such, the EU has failed to preserve

and extend social capital, yet this is a precondition for a functioning system of post-national governance. Without a proper shared European ethos, the EU will not become a global political actor, never mind a strategic power.

In his concluding comments, A. Clesse bemoaned the increasing intellectual lethargy in the East and the general lack of discipline. The absence of trust and sense of collectivity has induced a certain passivity which means that most people in the East fail to question their certainties and to revise their judgements. There is thus an urgent need for renewed intellectual vigour and rigour in order to devise a proper strategic vision. In the absence of such a cultural revival, only an acute threat from the East (for example an aggressively imperialist Russia) could lead to a common defence policy. The West of Europe does not fare much better. Divergence began in the 1970s when countries with very different agendas were admitted, e.g. the UK and Denmark. The strong Catholic consensus was gradually undermined and frequently gave way to a policy of the lowest common denominator. In the end, there may only be two extreme outcomes of the European integration and enlargement process. Either a radical deepening which would lead to some kind of supranational entity based on a profound surrender of national sovereignty. Or a loosening of existing structures which would evolve towards a large free trade area with a common regulatory framework.

Adrian Pabst
Research Fellow
LIEIS
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Appendix

Report of Working Group 1

The ultimate purpose of the European Union

The ultimate purpose has been constantly changing since the establishment of the EU. The initial idea was the enhancement of economic integration. Later on, it has changed to the political one, including the prevention of yet another World War.

However, the break-up of the USSR has been marked by the new political dynamics. In this context, the EU has set up a goal of filling in the emerging power vacuum on the European continent, trying to play a more independent role in its own destiny. In trying to perform this independent role, the EU pursues the purpose of becoming a significant actor or perhaps even a global actor on an international scale.

Thus, the new historic wave has brought the EU into the necessity of developing in certain areas:

1. Political dimension – fostering further enlargement of the EU into the post-Communist space.
2. Economic dimension – the European Community has developed into the EU after Maastricht, marking the new era of economic integration. The Euro-bureaucrats set up a goal of making the EU a competitive economic force on a global scale.
3. Security dimension – the EU has introduced a Common Foreign and Security Policy/European Security and Defence Policy (CFSP/ESDP), the ultimate success of which will shape the validity of the Union itself for the years to come.
4. Social dimension – to overcome psychological frustration of the decaying value system of the West.

All this can be achieved if the Union develops further into a Federation, overcoming the lax dynamics of German-type decision-making (as outlined by Prof. Fritz Scharpf), and switching to a bolder set of policies of central decision-making *à la* American federal system.

Report of Working Group 2

The foundations of the European Union

The foundations of the EU have never been and are not rigid. Instead, they are being adapted to the changing environment. The EU integration has started from merging of the economic and the agricultural domains and has been establishing itself as a political power as a result of deepening. As far as widening is concerned, the EU has been enlarging gradually and it is unclear as of yet where the borders of the Union will end.

The foundations of the EU will be analyzed through the following theories: realism, functionalism, liberalism, constructivism, inter-governmentalism, transnationalism and institutionalism. Since the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 spill-over has been taking place. The new challenges required a response on the part of the EU. Therefore, in 1957 Euratom and the European Economic Community were established and the Rome Treaty was signed by the six founding members, with the latter aiming at elimination of trade barriers and forming of a common market. In 1967 the three Communities were merged and the institutions of the EU were put in place. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 created the three pillars and introduced defense and justice & home affairs. Thus, the political dimension was underscored. The Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice targeted institutional changes and refinement of policies. The Constitutional Treaty aimed at merging the existing legal texts into a single whole.

From the realist perspective EU's foundations can be explained by the balance of power politics. To specify, the EU has been constructed as a counter-force to the Soviet Union and the United States. The fact that the Rome Treaty was signed after the Soviet troops entered Hungary and the reaction of the US to the Suez crisis supports the realist argument. And today's position of the EU as a third center of power is also an illustration of this.

The theory of liberalism claims that the foundations of the EU rest on the economic domain. The introduction of the Single European Act in 1987 and the completion of the Single Market in 1992, as well as the current capacity of the EU to negotiate trade agreements with third countries testifies that the liberalist argument holds. EU's propagation of human rights, democracy, fundamental freedoms is also an indication of the strength of the liberalist foundations of the EU. Therefore, the EU has been characterized as a soft or civilian power.

A social construction, the EU has been an elite project. The current situation after the signing of the Constitutional Treaty requires engaging the society in the European project. Thus, the latter is becoming a bottom-up construction in addition to the existing top-down one.

From the inter-governmentalist viewpoint the EU is an amalgam of member-states with high delegation of powers to the supranational level. In contrast, to inter-governmentalism, transationalism claims that different actors, namely, private, non-governmental, etc. are playing beyond the national scene and are influencing the European process.

Institutionalists state that the creation of the European institutions irrespective of the factors that led to institutional evolution, ensures continuity and once the institutions are in place it would be difficult to eradicate them. Therefore, EU integration would be self-sustaining.

Provided the theoretical approaches, one can see that the foundations of the EU can be explained by compiling all the explanations offered by the theories. Separately, they are reductionist. Together they offer a vision of the EU as a new entity, which provides economic and political stability both in and around the EU. This can be seen as the very European dream, which attracts new states to the EU.