Institut d'Etudes Européennes et Internationales du Luxembourg

Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Conference on

Is Europe's Role in World Affairs Bound to Decline?

1-2 October 2010

Castle of Schengen, Luxembourg

Introduction

On 1-2 October 2010, the Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies (LIEIS) convened the biennial conference of the directors of European institutes of international relations. Entitled 'Is Europe's role in world affairs bound to decline?', this conference consisted of eight discussion sessions, including a final session on how to take forward cooperation between participating institutes (cf. Appendix I). The event took place in the Castle of Schengen in Luxembourg and brought together about 40 participants from EU member states and other European countries (cf. list of participants and programme in Appendix II).

In his introductory remarks, Armand Clesse, Director of the LIEIS, welcomed the participants to Luxembourg and briefly recalled recent editions of the directors' conference. After raising the question of whether Schengen is a symbol of freedom or exclusion, he encouraged all speakers to eschew conventional views and diplomatic discourse in favour of a lively exchange of views and a substantive debate. Recalling that General Marshall had exhorted his staff to "avoid trivia", A. Clesse stressed that the ambition of the meeting is to generate new insights and formulate concrete policy recommendations. By combining both conceptual arguments and empirical evidence, the conference hopes to come up with conclusions that are of interest to scholars and policy-makers alike. The focus of the meeting is not merely on the EU but also on Europe as a whole, including the role of key countries such as Russia, Turkey and Ukraine.

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I. The main challenges for Europe in the international system in the coming decades

At the outset of the first session, A. Clesse argued that the EU and the rest of Europe seem weak and devoid of strategic vision. Leaving aside the problems associated with the concept of 'soft' and 'hard' power, Europe as a whole lacks both. European social models are in crisis, and there's no common basis for renewed societal development. With the possible exception of Turkey, European countries are suffering protracted demographic decline: populations are ageing, birth rates are falling and the costs of welfare state provisions are unsustainable. Crucially, the 'civilisational' model which Europe may represent or may have represented in the past seems bound to decay, especially faced with the rising powers in the East. The growing self-confidence of Eastern and Southern powers such as China, India and others, contrasts sharply with the gloom and pessimism that seems to reign across Europe. All this will diminish Europe's global influence.

The session continued with a series of interventions that focused on the current crisis and the challenges which Europe must confront in order to consolidate and enhance its role in world affairs. There was wide agreement among the participants that the ongoing decline affects all parts of Europe – not just the EU but also those European countries that are not members. However, different participants disagreed on the nature and extent of Europe's decline. Some argued that the Union is in a far greater crisis than the rest of Europe (A. Clesse; Walter Schwimmer; Seyfi Tashan), whereas others contended that the EU remains an attractive 'pole' and that the European periphery is struggling to provide peace and prosperity (Alexander Dynkin; Valery Kopiyka; Margaritis Schinas).

What are the EU's main challenges? At the very least, the EU's problems relate to its institutions, notably the institutional implications of the Lisbon Treaty. The interplay of the Commission and the Council has become even more complex, and the Union won't have sufficient foreign policy resources until the European External Action Service (EEAS) is in place. Crucially, a well-functioning EEAS that can provide proper external representation requires a sense of internal identity and unity – a key challenge for the 27. Likewise, the exit from the financial and the economic crisis can't happen without further fiscal coordination and a stronger regulatory system. In both foreign and economic policy, the question that arises from the crisis and the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty is who is responsible for what and how Community institutions interact with each other or with member states. The EU has set up or is in the process of establishing new institutions and mechanisms, but there is excessive duplication: some events are attended by representatives from the Council, the Commission, the country holding the rotating presidency as well as the High Representative (Jaap de Zwaan; W. Schwimmer).

According to some, the EU's woes have been exaggerated. To be sure, there are serious shortcomings such as the funding gap in the welfare state, various forms of 'democratic deficit' and the failure of the Union to take advantage of its technological and innovation edge in order to benefit from Chinese growth. This, coupled with navel-gazing that is so typical of Brussels, adds to a sense of European paralysis. But the EU can take concrete steps to escape from this impasse. First, it must nurture the transatlantic relationship that served Europe well for decades. Second, it must create greater economic inter-dependence with strategic partners.

Third, it must forge closer links with its neighbours instead of adopting some global outlook or developing a geo-political doctrine (Henning Riecke).

For others, the EU suffers from a lack of strategic thinking in relations with other European countries and rising global powers. There is no strategy of how to involve the other European partners beyond the EU. The distinction between candidate countries, pre-accession countries or neighbour countries masks the absence of any coherent strategic vision (W. Schwimmer). Unity in external actions is key for the EU. For instance, EU-Chinese relations include dozens of sectorial dialogues and policy areas but there is a need for a cohesive strategic partnership framework (M. Schinas). Many participants agreed that the weakest part of the EU is and remains the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This is true despite the new possibilities of the Lisbon Treaty, including the position of the High Representative and new instruments such as the EEAS. More specifically, there are three specific problems and challenges for the EU's foreign policy. First, the unanimity requirement continues to be an obstacle; second, the EU's failure to interact sufficiently with international organizations; third, a largely invisible and ineffective presence on the global scene (J. de Zwaan).

More fundamentally, the whole of Europe won't regain its former predominance in the world. Whether in terms of demography, technology or financial resources, the wider Europe has 800 million people but not nearly the same dynamism as India or China (W. Schwimmer). At the same time, both the EU and the countries in the greater Europe still have many assets, including the single biggest economic space and attractive social models. We need to put an end to the self-flagellation attitude of many Europeans (M. Schinas). There was agreement among many participants that the Union faces a twin challenge: first, it needs a single EU voice with a coherent diplomacy and, second, it must treat other European countries as partners.

The discussion then turned to the shape of global geo-politics. According to numerous speakers, the world is witnessing a change of balance, with the centre of gravity shifting from West to East. This change is not limited to the rise of China and India but includes other emerging economies like Indonesia. However, there was disagreement about the relative power of the EU and the countries in the wider Europe. For some, the first thing Europeans must recognise is that the EU will never be a global power like the USA or China. Since the EU is not a state, it will always be a different kind of 'political beast'. Second, in order to defend its interests and advance its objectives, the Union must stay true to European values. Indeed, global actors like the USA and China are following their own paradigm. Third, it would be an error to assume that the failure of the Copenhagen climate summit proves that the EU's role in global affairs is bound to decline: global governance still reflects European values and norms, as well as practical arrangements such as inter-regional cooperation, but, on the other hand, due to the current shift of power, the necessity to better apprehend other world visions becomes a necessity if Europe wants its views to be heard and understood (Marc Trenteseau).

For others, by contrast, the EU is in decline while the countries in the wider Europe are booming (S. Tashan; A. Dynkin). On current trends, the Union of 27 is lagging behind virtually all other countries in terms of economic growth. Demographically, Europe (with the exception of Turkey) will become even less relevant. However, the EU can still be dominant at the level of high technology and also high culture. Thus the key challenge is for the Union

to revive itself, but this time without the same security umbrella provided by the USA during the Cold War. As for unity across the whole of Europe, much of the continent is still living in a post-Napoleonic configuration characterised by nations. Only the Council of Europe has attempted to overcome the old divisions. For its part, Turkey wants to integrate the EU, but so far the Union is shying away. In response, Ankara has forged links with countries in the wider Eurasian space and has expanded its presence in Africa and South America as well as improved relations with global powers such as China, Russia and India. Both economically and politically, the EU – not Turkey – is now the sick man of Europe (S. Tashan).

Likewise, Russia looks to the West but has strategic links with the East. Seen from Moscow, the EU struggles to get its economic house in order and to build a coherent political project. The failure of the Lisbon Agenda and the current turmoil of the eurozone confirm the impression that the European economic model is in crisis – not to mention Europe's social models. Since the transition years of 1991-93 and the economic collapse of 1998, Russia has faced numerous problems. What is Russia's destiny? Is it a long, tortuous path towards liberal democracy and market economy or some other model? There's no consensus within the ruling regime but a majority of the Russian population still view closer cooperation with the West as Russia's best bet. In terms of foreign policy, Europe's moment seems to have passed. Moscow looks to Washington more than it does to Brussels (even though bilateral relations with Germany, France and Italy are key). The US-Russian reset is working, and the Kremlin is committed to nuclear non-proliferation and the fight against terrorism (A. Dynkin). All this raises the question whether Russia, Ukraine and Turkey will either join a wider European dispensation or try to become independent actors or will establish some kind of alternative to the EU (A. Clesse).

II. Europe's present capacities of action and its actual performance in the global power contest

The second session analysed Europe's present capacities and its actual performance in the current global power contest. A number of participants insisted that for outside observers Europe is virtually synonymous with the EU and that despite its structural problems there is no positive alternative to the Union (Mladen Stanicic; S. Tashan). Others focused on the potential and limits of the EU, arguing that the Union has been an overall success story and that it retains enormous appeal for candidate countries as well as global actors (M. Schinas; Petr Drulak).

In support of the first argument, it was said that the EU has been able to define and enforce much-needed domestic reforms in both accession and candidate countries (including political and administrative overhaul as well as the fight against corruption). The Union has its own problems and unresolved issues such as how to cope with the loss of national sovereignty or entrenched interests in relation to foreign policy. But there can be little doubt that on balance it has been positive for both members and non-members alike. For example, without pressure from Brussels and a variety of policy instruments, some countries on the Balkans could (have) become increasingly fascist (M. Stanicic).

Other participants suggested that the EU is main 'game in town', but that it fails to realise its enormous potential. Due to institutional rigidity and political paralysis, the Union of 27 has

been unable and perhaps unwilling to cope with the consequences of a trend towards a looser structure rather than a proper union. Without a common threat (as during the Cold War), diverse and centrifugal forces are gaining ground both within and without the EU. Concretely, the Union has not yet found an adequate response to what is happening in the world and how to address the new challenges. One factor that is hampering the EU's actual performance in the global power contest is a lack of trust among many members, perhaps as a result of excessively fast eastern enlargement. A smaller, more coherent EU was of greater interest to candidate countries like Turkey, but the EU of 27 does not appeal as much. This is because nationalist forces are pressurising the leadership of Germany and France not to admit Turkey or delay negotiations for several decades. But such forces as well as reluctant politicians and policy-makers across the Union fail to register that a strategic partnership between EU and Turkey (without full membership) is pure fiction (S. Tashan).

However, another group of participants argued that on balance the EU has been a success story and that its actual capacities have equipped it with sufficient power to shape global affairs. First, in addition to other problems, the EU suffers from a lack of collective leadership. Generally, the Union is at its best when it acts pragmatically and when member states together focus on the wider European neighbourhood. Second, as a global trading bloc, the EU promotes and projects both 'soft' and 'hard' power – and is unique among global powers in doing so (M. Schinas). Third, it is not a decline of the EU but rather of the whole West, especially the USA, that marks the most salient feature of the current global system. Even though the experience of Copenhagen is not encouraging, it is true that Europe is uniquely positioned to shape a world order (pooling national sovereignty, resolving conflict, managing migration or protecting the environment). Perhaps this is a cliché, but the EU's greatest foreign policy achievement was eastern enlargement – an experience that has lessons for global geo-politics. Seen in this light, the creation of the EEAS has significant potential and could create a new dynamics that might enable the EU to maximise its potential and improve its performance in global affairs (Michele Comelli).

But despite its achievements, the EU must also – according to a number of participants – change its *modus operandi* in order to translate its potential into a more effective performance. First of all, the key task for the Union is to define the model it represents and promotes – a choice between a multi-polar and a multi-lateral system. It is often said that the EU lacks a single voice, but what would be the purpose of such a unified position? The real issue is whether Europe wants more multi-polarity or more multilateralism – is it not the latter which Europe promotes and projects on the global stage? (P. Drulak). Second, global issues such as climate change and migration exceed the capacities of traditional state power. In principle, this favours the EU, but the Union faces a dilemma between idealism and realism and needs to engage with non-state actors in more imaginative ways. Another key question is how the EU can use the differences between member states in order to enhance common action (Roderick Parkes).

On this same issue, the third point that was made was that the EU increasingly resembles a big state (setting up a unified diplomatic service, etc.), so the question that arises is whether candidate countries share the project of building a big state. What kind of conceptions do they have of a common European project? (Teija Tiilikainen). Linked to this is the challenge of working differently after Lisbon: the 27 member states can no longer afford to engage in a unilateral delegation of powers to the centre. Instead, they urgently require trust- and

confidence-building measures and policies within the EU and its common institutions in Brussels. In turn, this transforms notions of future (strategic) partnerships with non-members (Anna Jardfelt Melvin).

Fourth, the EU must be both cautious and daring in order to overcome inertia and take part in global changes. Security policy is a good example. European security has not been discussed seriously at the official, top level for some time, yet there are new opportunities for the Union to shape current developments. The OSCE's Corfu process (conceived as a half-hearted response to the Russian President Medvedev's initiative to replace the existing system with a formal European security treaty) has been relegated to the margins and is getting nowhere. Instead of expressing selective agreement or disagreement with the specific provisions of the Russian draft, it would be better for the EU to come up with an alternative draft of its own that reflects an agreed transatlantic view on the political logic, legal format and the underlying value system of a possible new security arrangement. It is worth remembering that the conflict potential in the wider Black Sea/Caspian Sea region represents the single most serious security challenge for the EU and the whole of Europe (Sergiu Celac)

Fifth, it is crucial not to forget that the EU is fundamentally different from the US or Russia because it is not a nuclear force. In terms of trade, development aid and perhaps ideas, the EU is a global power but it will never be a military power. The world has changed beyond recognition: thirty years ago or so, the colonial heritage mattered to India, China, Brazil and Africa, whereas nowadays they are global players in their own right. Thus pragmatism is paramount: where can the EU make a genuine difference? (Daithi O'Ceallaigh).

Finally, A. Clesse contended that recent accession countries are weak and small, even if they are demographically important (for example, Poland and Romania). In the process of imposing the *acquis communautaire*, the Copenhagen criteria were almost completely forgotten – otherwise countries like Romania and Bulgaria might not be members (e.g. their treatment of the Roma). But a country as big as Turkey won't go down the route of being humiliated by repeated delays to its accession. Crucially, the rise of intolerance, Islamophobia and extreme rightist movements across Europe is a societal challenge that no EU government has so far been prepared to confront and address.

III. What role should Europe play and what role will it be able to play in world affairs?

In his remarks at the beginning of the third session, Christopher Coker argued that in some sense Europeans have to be what the EU wants them to be and see themselves as the EU sees them. The Union, in turn, is now in the unpleasant position of seeing itself through the eyes of others. By contrast, allies of Europe like the USA do not have to resort to the perception of others. America has a culturally constructed natural sense of self-esteem that Europe lacks. Other global powers like Russia or China neither understand, nor deal with, the EU; they do bilateral business with individual member states. Worse, it is now the case that former colonies like India view their former colonial masters such as the UK as a jewel in their crown, rather than the other way around. Far from simply restoring a certain balance of power, this situation has dramatic implications for Europe. If power corrupts, then powerlessness also corrupts.

The EU won't be a global power like the rest, but it does need a strategic vision. There are at least three reasons why it has failed to devise such a vision. First, it currently lacks a grand narrative. This is a historically unprecedented condition. In the past, the EU took part in the US grand narrative of the Cold War as well as the two unipolar moments following the fall of Communism – Europe's imagined unipolar moment in the 1990s and US unipolarity after 9/11. Second, the prevailing European narrative about itself and the world is delusional: human rights, global civil society, etc. are not ideals that resonate much across the world. Third, Europe has so far failed to give an account of its own identity: what is the EU becoming or aspiring to become? A 'soft' power? A 'smart soft' power NATO itself might still provide a measure of collective defence, but the monstrous short-termism that characterised eastern expansion and some 'out-of-area' interventions is responsible not just for the recent financial crisis but also for the current political impasse. However fashionable the discourse about the shift in the global balance of power to the East might be, both the USA and Europe are committed to the continuous supremacy of Western political and military power. In this sense, Medvedev's proposal for a new Euro-Atlantic security treaty is interesting, but NATO remains central to European security and Russia has no future outside that framework.

Following these remarks, the discussion touched on four closely related topics. First, European identity; second, the strengths and weaknesses of Europe's allies and rivals; third, European security; fourth, European capabilities and sources of 'soft' power.

On the first topic, one conceptual question is whether what is at stake is self-esteem or self-confidence. It seems as if the USA for the first time in its history has doubts about the long-term viability of the American dream. China, by contrast, reckons that it is recovering the position which it is owed by history. Europe is largely absent from the global contest for power and ideas. More fundamentally, the rise and decline of different powers raises questions about the importance of trends and phenomena such as fatigue or sclerosis. Painful surgery like cutting back on social benefits in the West or limiting the rise of workers' wages in the East might breed social dissatisfaction that could perhaps fuel societal disaffection (A. Clesse). Others agreed that Europe's power will further diminish, but that this decline is not absolute. Instead, it is relative compared with other parts of the world. The genuine problem is domestic development, e.g. in France which is once more ripe with social strife. That's where the real danger lies (Fernando Cardoso).

On the second topic – Europe's allies and rivals – it was said that rapidly developing countries like China face growing challenges. First of all, emerging markets and rising powers are facing immense social, political, economic, social and ethnic problems which are currently being swept under the carpet. Is the rapid growth rate sustainable? For how long? A slowdown in growth threatens both the social stability and perhaps even the territorial integrity of countries like China and possibly India (Daniel Nord). Beijing has replaced the notion of 'peaceful rise' with the ideal of 'harmonious development'. Those are not empty phrases but rather indicate a deliberate intention to dispel apprehensions about China's hegemonic ambitions. Despite unprecedented economic dynamism and political activism, China and other eastern emerging economies are now reluctant to speak of 'Asian values' and refer to global integration instead. They are becoming aware of the fact that the current model of development is neither sustainable for the world (rising global imbalances, environmental concerns) nor viable for China itself (growing polarisation between rich and poor). As such,

the twin challenge for Beijing is to boost imports without substantially reducing exports and to develop the inland provinces without neglecting the coastal powerhouses. In response to increasing international clamour in favour of revaluing the Yuan, the Chinese leadership is seeking to re-balance the economy (urban-rural; industry-agriculture) and unleash the entrepreneurial spirit in the countryside. All this is relevant to EU interests. (S. Celac).

Moreover, the EU's relations with the rest of the world are not a zero-sum game. Instead, the European promotion of trade and inter-regional cooperation can help stabilise volatile parts across the globe. For example, the South China Sea is currently a zone of competition that could evolve into an area of cooperation. For its part, Russia has massive demographic problems that exceed the crisis of Europe's social models (Tamas Magyarics). What is remarkable is that many rising powers are authoritarian or even autocratic – a novelty in the international system. Thus one purpose of the West may be to forge an alliance of survival in the face of tension between efficiency and democracy (László Kiss).

At the same time, it should not be forgotten that both China and India are already big powers and that their sustained growth shows few signs of slowing down significantly. In terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), China's economy could overtake that of the USA by 2025 or 2030 (A. Clesse). Furthermore, China seeks cultural ties across the globe, and the potential of Chinese 'soft' power seems considerable (S. Tashan; M. Hirsch).

On the third topic – European security – it was argued that Europe may disagree on NATO and other aspects of defence and security policy, but there are substantial resources in terms of coordination, information exchange and relations of trust. For example, there is a widely shared perception of the threats facing Europe. First, terrorism (which requires close cooperation at the level of information, policing, etc.); second, naval and maritime security (naval transport links are key to Europe and a significant strategic sector); third, cyber-warfare and the vulnerability of IT and other computer-based systems (D. Nord). But one of the main problems is that the EU lacks the institutional structures and political unity to act as a single power. For example, there are two EU ambassadors in Geneva, at the WTO and at the UN. On foreign policy, the EU is adopting a negotiating mandate that is not Germany's, France's or Malta's position; all this shows the complex relationship between sovereign countries, countries as member states and the EU as an entity (Nicolas Levrat).

On the fourth topic – Europe's capabilities and sources of 'soft' power – it was said that the EU has shaped global economic governance at the level of the G20 but also within the EU member states. Once more, the question that arises is how Europe is supposed to deal with the rest of the world (L. Kiss). According to other participants, Europe's 'soft' power is being undermined by an acute lack of 'hard' power. The issue is not one of competence but one of action. Linked to this is the EU's foreign policy, blending internal and external capabilities (J. de Zwaan).

In his responses to some of the preceding interventions, C. Coker urged participants to get real about European 'soft' power: Baroness Catherine Ashton's appointment was disastrous for the perception of EU influence in the world. In Antiquity, cultures worshipped gods, language and philosophy, but many cultures were ultimately despised for their lack of 'hard' power. One tragedy is that Europeans no longer read proper novels like those of Leo Tolstoy and that therefore they forget about the repetition of history.

IV. How is Europe's role perceived by non-European powers and regions? What do they expect of Europe?

The fourth session turned to the perception of Europe's role by non-European powers and the expectations they have of Europe in global affairs.

In his introductory remarks, W. Schwimmer argued that Europe has no overarching vision – neither a grand vision of peace nor a strategic vision of influence. This is all the more tragic since foreign powers would like to see the EU as a guarantor of peace and factor of stability in world politics. The European principle of unity in diversity has universal value and can blend differences harmoniously. More specifically, Europe combines Greek 'soft' power and Roman 'hard' power. But when Europe looks back to its history, it must remember not just the legacy of Rome but also that of Byzantium.

In his short presentation, Alex Vines outlined a view of Europe from Africa. EU policies are in part seen as a set of experiments with very mixed results. Inter-regional cooperation is absolutely key. A variety of initiatives have shaped African perceptions of Europe, not just the long-standing institutionalised framework of the ACP-EU assembly but also the ongoing dialogue between the African Union (AU) and the EU or between the AU and NATO. Africa associates 'soft' power with the EU, particularly in relation to Higher Education, student exchange and other forms of educational cooperation. As such, it's not all about China, India, South Korea or Turkey, but essentially about the EU. Initiatives with European businesses (in terms of know-how; efficiency, etc.) are indispensable to African economic development. Moreover, some lessons based on past and present experience with the EU (both positive and negative) can help generate best practices and beneficial cooperation with non-EU partners. Thus, African countries recognise both the transformative effects and the limits of relations with EU countries.

In the discussion that followed these remarks, participants commented on the various views of Europe around the world. In relation to the Middle East, it is clear that Israel loves European 'soft' power. Why has Europe's input in the Middle East Quartet been so limited? The Palestinians would like more European 'hard' power – or at the very least more sustained influence (Alain Dieckhoff). Except for certain US 'neo-cons' and their acolytes, the division of Europe into 'old' and 'new' Europe is uncommon and not used by powers such as China and India (though Russia, Poland and the Baltic States have viewed each other with suspicion). But in terms of EU foreign policy, there are no fundamental differences between old and new member states (P. Drulak). More fundamentally, non-European powers like China and India are certainly doubtful about the EU's political 'single voice' – but not about the 'single market' which they see as Europe's greatest strength and asset (S. Celac).

The discussion then turned to the nature of European power and influence in world affairs. Some participants suggested that non-European powers consider the EU in terms of legality and legitimacy, i.e. international law and political authority. Their perception is that EU officials are not elected but appointed and that they are neither accountable – nor are their institutions transparent. Invariably this has an impact on the effectiveness of the EU's agenda of democracy promotion (S. Celac). Other participants argued that global geo-politics used to

be about empires, but it is no longer. Now there is Copenhagen and a whole process (chapters, negotiations, votes) governing accession, association or neighbourhood policies (M. Schinas). However, other participants contended that on democratic standards and human rights, there is widespread hypocrisy and double standards in the EU's dealings with Russia, Ukraine and Turkey (A. Clesse). This raises questions about the legitimate application of power. Even though democracies prevail, many democracies have normative foreign policies that are not liberal-international (e.g. Brazil, South Africa or India). There has thus been a divorce of power from the principles of liberalism. Just as Eastern policy towards regimes like the Burmese military junta is questionable, so Western 'gunboat philanthropy' has equally failed (C. Coker).

There was also a debate on the conditions for greater European power and influence in world affairs. Some participants argued that the EU's role in global politics is not necessarily bound to decline and that the main condition is more initiative and leadership: the EU must become a pole in a multipolar world (Plamen Pantev). Nor is it true that the EU was much more united at 12 or 15 than at 27. On the contrary, eastern enlargement has enabled the EU to have a proper neighbourhood policy and thus to extend its reach beyond the confines of member states (M. Comelli). It seems to be the case that the European model of socio-economic development is much appreciated around the world – even if it is not always as effective as the Chinese model. Especially the emerging and buoyant middle classes of India and China look to their European counterparts. Generally speaking, people have greater expectations about countries like Portugal because of membership in the EU (F. Cardoso).

V. Institutions for the future Europe: Modifying and strengthening present ones? Devising new ones?

The fifth session focused on European institutions and the case for or against devising new ones. In his short remarks at the beginning of the session, Adrian Pabst argued that the end of bipolarity and unipolarity provides Europe with a unique opportunity to reshape global affairs. After the collapse of state communism in 1989 and the ongoing crisis of 'free-market' capitalism since 2007, both the left and the right need to come up with genuinely fresh ideas and policies. What characterises much of Europe and sets it apart from the rest of the world is a long tradition of viewing the 'intermediary institutions' of civil society as more primary than either the central national state or the transnational market. Intermediary institutions refer to groups and bodies as diverse as professional associations, guilds, trade unions, voluntary organisations, universities and religious communities. Instead of operating on the basis of either state administrative or economic contractual relations, such and similar structures are governed by social bonds of reciprocal trust and mutual assistance. These bonds of reciprocity and mutuality are not limited to the third, 'voluntary' sector that is separate from both the public and the private sector. On the contrary, these bonds can regulate social relations at all levels of society and thereby help 're-embed' both the state and the market into the complex web of social relations.

Such a model is neo-medieval in that it combines a strong sense of overlapping jurisdictions and multiple membership with a contemporary focus on transnational networks as well as the institutions and actors of 'global civil society'. Nor is this model limited to the sub-national level. Rather, modes of association and corporation can apply to families, neighbourhoods,

communities, cities, regions and states alike. For example, the idea of Europe as a political union is inextricably linked to the idea that national states are more like regions within a wider polity – a subsidiary (con-)federation of nations rather than a centralised super-state or a glorified free-trade area. Indeed, the twin founding principles of European integration – solidarity and subsidiarity – suggest that nations can and do uphold and promote relations of mutual giving and reciprocal help. As such, Europe can offer a vision beyond the authoritarian central state and the transnational, anarchical 'free market'.

This sparked a debate about the nature and range of current European institutions. Whilst modern sovereignty is essentially a liberal concept, is it not the case that EU institutions already have a communitarian dimension, which qualifies the liberal project (citizenship, solidarity, etc.)? At the EU level however, there are many more problems with communal arrangements such as a lack of transparency and accountability as well as problems with equality and equal access (T. Tiilikainen). Moreover, what about the US model of civil society? Is not the US legacy far richer and more developed than European tradition? (P. Drulak). Of course it is true that there are dangers with liberalism (including authoritarian, 'casino capitalism'), but liberalism has a long history of overcoming many crises. As such, liberal democracy is the best regime and will survive (M. Stanicic).

In response, A. Pabst agreed that the EU is not predicated on an atomistic liberalism that reduces the human person to a purely individualistic agent. It is also true that communitarism lacks universality because it privileges communities at the expense of groups and diverse forms of association. However, the EU's political and legal system is based upon the primacy of the individual and the collective – the citizen and the state. The problem is that sovereign power oscillates between these two poles, to the detriment of group rights and group identity. Likewise, regions play a role but they are still viewed essentially as sub-national entities, when in reality many European regions trade more with each other across national border than with the rest of their respective country (As N. Levrat remarked, municipalities are the only clearly defined entity in the EU, as European citizens can vote in local and EP elections). As for liberal market economy, it has an in-built tendency towards monopoly. Thus A. Pabst concluded that the mark of contemporary liberal democracy and market economy is that they produce a centralisation of power and a concentration of wealth that undermines the social bonds upon which all societies and polities depend.

The debate then focused on concrete institutional problems and possible solutions. First of all, the participants discussed the prospect of wider institutional and political reform. The European integration process was from the outset built on a system of two pillars, one intergovernmental and the other supranational. This has far-reaching implications for the new EEAS: building on the work of the Commission delegations, the good functioning of European 'Embassies' will require a high degree of coordination with national Embassies. One potential problem is that the EEAS might not be prepared to take over the fundamental role of coordinator which has been at the core of the former rotating presidencies. If this does not happen, the risk is real to see some kind of competition arising between the national diplomatic networks and the European one. Were this to take place, the risk of competition with the EEAS could be even more acute in countries where member states do have specific national interests to protect. Hence the necessity to maintain a good coordination with the national networks not only in Brussels but also on the spot, in the partner countries where most of the analysis and of the in depth knowledge is concentrated (M. Trenteseau).

It was also argued that many reflections and concrete proposals would require treaty reform, which is not realistic at this juncture. This applies to ideas such as fusing the Council and the Commission Presidency (Marco Incerti). According to a number of participants, it would be a disaster to question the current institutional framework. What is perhaps needed is a debate on the use of QMV (J. de Zwaan). More generally, some participants maintained that there is a false choice between widening and deepening – both are needed and proceed in tandem. The newcomers have not imported new divisions or cleavages (Andres Kasekamp).

Second, on the economy some participants advocated the creation of a proper system of European economic governance, including a European Monetary Fund. Such a fund would have the status of an agency rather than a new institution. Therefore it would not require a complex process of treaty revision (M. Incerti). Current reflections go beyond the failed Lisbon Agenda and could produce a social consensus but so far European social models are in crisis. The fact is that many existing instruments were not used, e.g. against those countries violating the Stability and Growth Pact. Sooner or later the EU countries will have to give up some of their voting rights as part of the IMF. The head of the Eurogroup, Luxembourg's Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker, is desperate for a single representation of the Eurogroup at the level of the IMF but this antagonises both France and Germany. All this is linked to reforms of global governance (M. Hirsch). As for fiscal competition, this is not a new problem, as it already arose in relation to Ireland's tax structure. There are simply different fiscal regimes that reflect different national priorities. Interestingly, countries with a flat tax rate like Lithuania (around 20%) have also the lowest levels of public debt. This has got nothing to do with the EU and the Union should not be blamed for differential tax regimes (Ramunas Vilpisauskas).

Other participants voiced their concern about the overall performance of the EU economy. In order to preserve the high standards of living, Europe must enlarge its production levels and keep up exports to the rest of the world. This, in turn, requires either high innovation or low wages – a set of conditions similar to the period after the first oil shock in 1973. Competitors like Japan will concentrate on innovation and technology, such as biotech and robotic technology. The simple truth is that many goods and services are no longer produced at competitive prices in Europe (S. Tashan).

Third, on European security, it was said that NATO reveals problems of coordination and that the new proposed strategic concept does not seem capable of solving this. One key problem is lack of coordination at the level of foreign ministries and defence ministries (W. Schwimmer). Nor should it be assumed that NATO commands the support of the European people. If a referendum was held in Ireland today, NATO membership would be opposed by more than 90% (D. O'Ceallaigh). The issue of European security also raises questions about the future of other existing institutions. What will be the future role of the Council of Europe? What if the EU as a corporate legal body joined the European Convention of Human Rights, with possible conflicts between the ECJ and the Strasbourg Court? Beyond ideas about closer links with the so-called European 'periphery', a stronger emphasis should be placed upon regional arrangements. This could include a European security council, perhaps even with the membership of Israel, Lebanon, etc. (J. de Zwaan).

But it was contended that in relation to pan-European arrangements, some existing institutions are questionable – not intrinsically but because members are doubtful about the usefulness of these institutions, e.g. Russia vis-à-vis the OSCE. At the same time, there is the as yet unrealised potential of other pan-European organisations such as the Council of Europe or the UN Economic Commission for Europe. The possible EU draft policy document as an alternative to the Russian proposed Treaty on European Security could also include a more powerful joint parliamentary assembly by combining the expertise of the plethora of such representative bodies that exist at present (S. Celac).

A. Clesse concluded the session by arguing that the processes of widening and deepening are not compatible. This is a fallacy, perhaps not conceptually but certainly in practice. The institutional deepening following enlargement has tended to be marginal, almost like homeopathic adaptations (with the possible exception of the Maastricht Treaty). The Lisbon Treaty exemplifies this lack of ambition and honesty about the reality of the EU. Perhaps the Commission is now an obsolete institution that needs to be overhauled or abolished. We must also think beyond the EU: will Turkey, Ukraine and Russia really join by 2030, perhaps via some transitional structures? If the OSCE and the Council of Europe are weak, what other institutions can we think of? This was further discussed in the sixth and final session.

VI. Europe and the world, 2010 to 2050. In 2050

At the start of the final session, A. Clesse insisted that it is important to distinguish different conceptual levels: first, the political-diplomatic level; second, the socio-economic one; third, military and security issues; fourth, the cultural level. Moreover, we need to be clear about what is conceivable, desirable and feasible.

In his remarks, W. Schwimmer recalled that the High Authority of Coal and Steel was going to be created within the remit of the Council of Europe, but the UK was opposed to this fusion, so it was established separately. In many ways, this has contributed to the proliferation of disparate and uncoordinated institutions. Today there are too many, not too few, institutions: the EU, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, NATO, the Black Sea Cooperation framework as well as the Union of the Mediterranean. Of course, Europe will always be larger and wider than the EU. What is crucial is a 'right of equal footing' in relations between all countries. As for the future of the EU, except for Russia, most European countries will join over the next 30 years . Russia will probably adopt much of the *acquis communautaire* as part of a customs union and other arrangements. The European Convention of Human Rights, the European Cultural Convention at the level of the Council of Europe and the European Social Charter must be used much more by EU member states. The Council of Europe can be a pan-European vehicle, but this requires closer coordination between foreign and defence ministries as well as among different desks within foreign ministries.

How is the future of Europe seen by non-EU countries? There was wide agreement that history is central to the debates on European cooperation. The EU will continue to evolve in terms of concentric circles and multi-speed integration. As such, the work of both David Mitrany and Stanley Hoffmann still has insights for current debates. Instead of ideological debates, what is required is mutually beneficial cooperation across the wider Europe – including a customs union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. All this will help Europe

in the global economy. As a medium-sized country and within the "double asymmetry" relationship system, Ukraine has an important role to play in the interaction between big and small member states of the EU and the Customs union. The new Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovich has conducted a very active foreign policy vis-à-vis the EU (V. Kopiyka).

Other participants insisted that the three 'outsiders' Russia, Turkey and Ukraine are very different countries. There's frustration in Turkey about being in the waiting room for so long. Moreover, some provisions of the *acquis communautaire* could hurt Turkey's development. It is wrong to lump together Turkey, Ukraine and Russia because Turkey is already far more involved in the EU than the rest (A. Dynkin; S. Tashan). However, it was contended that Turkey pursues a Neo-Ottoman and Neo-Islamist strategy, as exemplified by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's book. Indeed, Ankara seeks to establish a strategic presence on the Balkans, in the Middle East, Central Asia, Latin America and even Africa. In this sense it's a matter for Turkey to conform to European standards, not vice-versa. There's almost boundless arrogance and narcissism on Turkey's part. The Cyprus situation and other Turkish neo-imperial tendencies point towards something like a drive to expand Turkey's *Lebensraum* (Costas Melakopides). But one participant sharply disagreed, saying that if EU member states still have their own agenda, why wouldn't Turkey? Of course, the presence of Turkish troops in Northern Cyprus is a problem but that can be resolved and should not be an obstacle to Turkish EU accession (W. Schwimmer).

The discussion moved from non-European powers to the EU. First, the Union's foreign policy continues to be characterised by a lack of clear priorities in several policy areas. This follows from the way the EU achieves its consensus positions in preparation for big diplomatic forums. To have clear priority policy goals requires red lines, fallback positions or plans C and D, which are communicated to other diplomatic delegations. This leads to serious risks of being marginalised in the end game of international diplomatic conferences, such as the 2006 Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Summit. Second, even where there are the priorities in terms of strategic partnerships with EU's neighbours, there's neither sequencing nor strategic thinking. Outsiders perceive the EU to give insufficient priority to their particular region as it seemingly wants to be everywhere. Third, the internal and external perceptions of the EU differ fundamentally. Many of the larger partners of the EU, for example China or India, prefer to deal with individual EU member states in areas such as security, counter-terrorism, than with the EU as a whole, because they do not see the EU as a relevant actor in those domains. This is different in areas such as trade, for example. Fourth, Europeans have a tendency to view the EU as a boiling cauldron that is permanently in action. However, by permanently focusing on internal reform and building institutions, the EU is missing the major transformations that are taking place in the outside world. However, the US will be very different, while China will face enormous challenges. The weight of individual EU member states in international affairs will become negligible because they are too small. Climate change, disarmament and nuclear proliferation will pose major threats to world stability. Fifth and finally, there's a challenge to the universality of international law and norm. In its external actions, the EU will face growing difficulties to spread its values of human rights, international order based on the rule of law, peace and reconciliation and persuade other countries to embrace its norms. The counterweight of big powers in a multi-polarising world, with increased emphasis on regions, is likely to grow. (Jean Pascal Zanders).

Even though prediction is speculative, we can probably assume that by 2050, Russia won't have joined the EU while transatlantic links will be weaker, as the US will shift the focus of its foreign policy from Europe to Asia. Other factors and themes include, first, demography; second, innovation and investment in new technology (biological sciences, robotics, nanotechnology, space and information and green technologies); third, terrorism; fourth, relations with Islam; fifth, a new energy regime; sixth, natural events such as meteors or pandemics (Thanos Dokos).

According to C. Coker, the future is inherently indeterminate, so any predictions are futile. Indeed, history is characterised by gateway events like 9/11. However, on current trends the EU will have 20% of global GDP by 2035, like the US, with China's economy representing about 25%. But by 2035 Europeans will be down to 9% of world population (5-7% in 2050), compared with 25% in 1900. Despite this substantial decline in terms of demography, one can be optimistic about the European component of world affairs. First of all, the EU's and Russia's share of global economic output will continue to be significant. In addition to the EU's share of 20%, Russia's economy will amount to about 7% of world GDP. In this sense, Russia will be a European power, though not a global power. Many Russians feel that they are in Europe, but not of Europe, but even Eurasia is a European idea.

Similarly, by 2050 the US will be the youngest country in the Asia-Pacific space, compared with China which will be the oldest country. This will have huge implications for dynamism and innovation. India is a liberal, parliamentary democracy, speaking English and reading J.S. Mill, so liberal principles and policies will continue to spread – just not in the same way as the US promotion of global market democracy. In fact, the Pacific Rim will be predominantly Christian, both Catholic and Pentecostal. Europe has what the French social historian Fernand Braudel called 'the sepoy factor', turning weakness into strength. European ideas and practices will continue to be influential.

By contrast, the Chinese are not interested in other cultures, certainly not in African culture. The bad news is the Middle East where Europe will not be a player, so others will have to get involved. By 2012 when Iran will be a nuclear power, the entire balance of power will change. So in short, the European component of world affairs will continue to be important, but the EU seems unable to translate these cultural resources into real power.

Following these reflections, the discussions focused on Europe's place in the global economy. Some participants argued that the future role of Europe will depend on its ability to develop a new model of sustainable growth based on entrepreneurship, innovation and new technology. The most recent talk is of a "blue economy" (the latest Club of Rome report) that imitates the operation of eco-systems and goes beyond the much-vaunted green economy by harnessing the potential of biosciences, robotic technology and other innovative techniques to reduce and eventually eliminate any form of waste. The post-ideological age which we seem to have entered and the realistic promises of the on-going technological revolution may well mark the end of utopia. (S. Celac).

Others stressed the importance of the quality of human capital, which will determine in large part not just technological and resource potential but also military capabilities. In this sense, geo-economic and geo-technological considerations will replace traditional geo-politics. The USA will remain central for 20-30 years, in terms of innovation (new communication

products like i-pad), its young, educated and dynamic workforce and the inflow of highly qualified migrant labour. China and the EU will respectively rise and decline, but China faces problems of rapid growth and modernisation (corruption, pollution, inequality, fate of mega-cities). Trans-regional powers like Germany will play a greater role but only in conjunction with other such trans-regional powers. Russia is a second- or third-level power, with a nuclear arsenal and resources but in other respects a power in decline. China will increasingly act as the global defender of free trade in order to secure growth and expansion (A. Dynkin).

In the final part of the session, the discussions returned to the issue of European foreign policy. N. Levrat remarked that there is nothing more difficult than prediction, especially about the future! One key task for the EU is to balance universal values with particular traditions. A greater self-assertion of the EU on the international stage will probably strengthen European influence without however solving deep disagreement within the Union. But at the same time, the foreign policy agenda will increasingly be set by external powers.

Other participants contended that the foreign policy committee of the EP will no longer be a talking shop but have some real bite. This is part of a wider change. Until recently, the US only discussed security and defence with individual member states within the framework of NATO. For the past three years however, there has been a slight shift, as the US recognises that Europe has a growing identity and intends to act in concert (M. Incerti). In turn, this raises questions about the role of multilateral diplomacy in a multipolar world. The nature of the EU as a political system means that it will continue to attract countries, not just in the wider neighbourhood but also across the world (as the single biggest economic space and the promoter of certain values). What is clear is that the EU will continue to lack 'hard' power and that it won't be well-prepared for proxy wars or other conflicts (H. Riecke).

More generally, the greatest global security challenge will be nuclear proliferation by both state and non-state actors. The fate of the START treaty and other aspects of strategic weapons will be key in shaping both debate and policy-making. New principles that might emerge on the international stage will include inclusiveness, responsibility and legality, as already evinced by Medvedev's proposed treaty. In fact, Eurasia is a 1990s term that has strong left-wing connotations. Today, Russia is perceived as a Euro-Pacific state with strategic interests on both 'fronts'. 2012 won't simply see Iran acquire nuclear weapons capability but also a possible change of guards in Russia, the USA, China, France as well as the anniversary of the North Korean revolution. All this could change global geo-political dynamics in the short-term – never mind the trajectory from 2015 to 2050 and beyond (A. Dynkin).

Conclusion

All the participants agreed that the discussions were rich in content and often controversial. Despite deep disagreements about the state of the EU and numerous nuances in relation to the wider Europe, a number of conclusions can be distilled.

First of all, both the EU and other European countries face unprecedented economic, social and political challenges linked to demographic and global trends. Europe's role in world affairs will change since its economic and military power will decline. However, Europe still

has assets such as political stability, the largest single economic space and technological innovation in a number of fields.

Second, the emerging multipolar world offers new opportunities for European influence across the globe. But so far European powers have been unable to act in concert because they lack a shared grand narrative and a strategic vision.

Third, the Union and its most important neighbours have failed to translate Europe's substantial resources and assets into power and influence. Even the EU's 'strategic partnerships' with neighbouring countries have not produced significant results. A greater global presence is not helped by growing heterogeneity among EU member states and a tendency for navel-gazing.

Fourth, the global shift in the balance of power represents not only serious risks to Europe's international role but also enormous opportunities to shape world affairs. In particular, the EU could play a much greater role if it pursues a realistic and pragmatic policy focusing on

a. the wider European neighbourhood, especially those countries that the EU has either neglected or frustrated (Russia and especially Turkey)
b. better relations with some of the existing international organisations, e.g. NATO, the IMF, the Council of Europe and the OSCE
c. taking a lead in addressing major challenges such as environmental issues or the fragmentation of international law

Adrian Pabst
October 2010

Appendix I

The final session was devoted to a brief discussion of common concerns (such as agenda-setting, recruitment, funding and fundraising) as well as possibilities of cooperation (including inter-institutional linkages) between institutes.

All the participants said that there are enormous differences between the various institutes, especially with respect to the nature and extent of funding, the size of budgets, the number of researchers and other operational aspects. However, there are also many common challenges, notably new sources of funding, the link between research and policy-making as well as closer cooperation.

According to the speakers, the key challenge for all the institutes and for their joint cooperation concerns funding. Since the 1990s, the ongoing reduction of core funding makes external funding necessary for most institutes. In several institutes, researchers are hired with the explicit brief of fundraising for specific projects, often combining research and policy-making. It is also the case that conferences are increasingly used as platforms to raise funds. This can be achieved by charging attendance fees and/or by recruiting sponsors. Some institutes are offering summer schools that serve the dual purpose of fund-raising and outreach.

More specifically, one pressing problem is how best to achieve the right mix between commercial and government money in order to remain independent. It seems that some government money comes with numerous strings attached or that institutes receiving public funds are not seen to be as independent as others. For example, the CEPS is currently trying to shed the perception to be a think-tank of the European Commission by cutting official EU funding to below 3% (M. Incerti).

However, all the discussants confirm that they are able to manage this problem since both public and private donors often want to support an independent voice. Independence is in the interest of the recipients who can conduct their own research and also in the interest of donors who can use research output selectively.

The second key challenge identified by the participants relates to the presentation and visibility of institutes as independent think-tanks. This is very important for the question of independence, but also for the activities of institutes. For instance, Chatham House was able to transform itself from an imperial institution to a truly international independent think-tank. Linked to this is another transformation, binding together research with policy ideas. The old purism of separating academic research from policy-making no longer holds true. Just as researchers at think-tanks are publishing academic, peer-reviewed journal articles, so too a growing number of universities are moving into the world of think-tank and policy-making. This is also reflected in the spread of hybrid documents such as short analytical overviews and briefing notes, sometimes accessible as part of membership schemes (A. Vines). As such, institutes and think-tanks will face increased competition from universities.

Third, the recruitment of young researchers is more difficult since they not only need to raise funds but must also be able to write readable papers, give talks in public, contribute to the print and broadcast media as well as assume important administrative tasks.

Fourth, many institutes struggle to maintain journals and/or yearbooks. The regular publication of a yearbook or a journal helps promote the visibility of institutes and their contribution to public debates. Therefore, in-house publications are central to their activities. However, numerous institutes struggle to cover the costs of their publications and have had to suspend or even stop such and similar projects. Closely connected to this issue is the challenge of finding new target groups, e.g. decision- and policy-makers who are increasingly targeted by way of newsletters.

The discussion concluded with a number of concrete proposals in relation to closer cooperation between the participating institutes – in addition to the biennial conference and other existing links.

First of all, there seems to be a need for networks. Most institutes are members of more than one research network. There is also cooperation in specific areas, e.g. SIPRI's yearbook is translated into Russian – the outcome of long-standing links between the Stockholm-based SIPRI and the Moscow-based IMEMO (A. Dynkin).

Second, there was a brief debate about the usefulness of the global think-tank ranking by the University of Pennsylvania. Several participants argue for a second, European ranking agency in order to give a more balanced ranking.

At the end of the final session, S. Celac offered to host the next biennial conference in Bucharest provided that his institute can raise the necessary funds. If that were not feasible, J. de Zwaan suggested holding the conference in The Hague.

Appendix II

Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies (LIEIS)

Biennial conference of the directors of
European institutes of international relations

Is Europe's role in world affairs bound to decline?

1-2 October 2010
Castle of Schengen

Programme

Friday 1 October 2010

09.00-09.15 Welcome remarks

09.15-10.45 **Session 1:** *The main challenges for Europe in the international system in the coming decades*

11.15-13.00 **Session 2:** *Assessing the present capacities of action and the actual performance of Europe in the global power contest*

14.30-16.00 **Session 3:** *What role should Europe play in world affairs? What role will it be able to play?*

16.30-18.00 **Session 4:** *How Europe's role is perceived by non-European powers and regions? What do they expect of Europe?*

Saturday 2 October 2010

09.00-10.45 **Session 5:** *Institutions for the future Europe: modifying and strengthening present ones? Devising new ones?*

11.15-13.00 **Session 6:** *Europe and the world 2010 to 2050. In 2050.*

14.30-16.00 **Session 7:** *The work of European institutes of international affairs: state of the art; tasks ahead*

16.30-18.00 **Session 8:** *Common concerns of the institutes (agenda-setting, recruitment, funding and fundraising), possibilities of cooperation (inter-institutional linkages)*

List of Participants

Country	Name	Position	Institute
Belgium	Trenteseau, Marc	Director General	EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations
	Incerti, Marco	Research Fellow	Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Bulgaria	Pantev, Plamen	Director	Institute for Security and International Studies
Council of Europe	Schwimmer, Walter	Director	European Democracy Forum
Croatia	Staničić, Mladen	Former Director	Institute for International Relations
Cyprus	Melakopides, Costas	Chairman	Institute for Mediterranean, European and International Studies (KIMEDE)
Czech Republic	Drulak, Petr	Director	Institute of International Relations
Denmark	Hvidt, Nanna	Director	Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Estonia	Kasekamp, Andres	Director	Estonian Foreign Policy Institute
EU	Schinas, Margaritis	Deputy Head of the Bureau of European Policy Advisers (BEPA)	European Commission
	Zanders, Jean Pascal	Research Fellow	EU Institute for Security Studies
Finland	Tiilikainen, Teija	Director	Finnish Institute of International Affairs
France	Dieckhoff, Alain	Research Director	Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI)
Germany	Parkes, Roderick	Director of the Brussels office	German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)
	Riecke, Henning	Head of the US/Transatlantic Relations Program	German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Greece	Dokos, Thanos	Director General	Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Hungary	Kiss, László J.	Research Director	Hungarian Institute of International Affairs
	Magyarics, Tamas	Director	Hungarian Institute of International Affairs
Iceland	Hansson, Pia	Director	Institute of International Affairs; Centre for Small States Studies

Ireland	O'Ceallaigh, Daithi	Director General	Institute for International and European Affairs (IIEA)
Italy	Comelli, Michele	Senior Fellow	Institute of International Affairs
Latvia	Bukovskis, Karlis	Assistant Director	Latvian Institute of International Affairs
Lithuania	Vilpišauskas, Ramūnas	Director	Institute of International Relations and Political Science
Luxembourg	Clesse, Armand	Director	Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies (LIEIS)
	Pabst, Adrian	Research Associate	Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies (LIEIS)
	Hirsch, Mario	Director	Pierre Werner Institute
Netherlands	de Zwaan, Jaap W.	Director	Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael"
Poland	Foks, Jacek	Deputy Director	Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Portugal	Cardoso, Fernando Jorge	Research Director	Institute for Strategic and International Studies
Romania	Celac, Sergiu	Director	Romanian Institute of International Studies, EURISC Foundation
Russia	Dynkin, Alexander	Director	The Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO)
Slovakia	Strazay, Tomas	Head of the Research Programme	Research Centre of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association
Sweden	Jardfelt Melvin, Anna	Director	Swedish Institute of International Affairs
	Nord, Daniel	Deputy Director	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Switzerland	Levrat, Nicolas	Director	European Institute, University of Geneva
Turkey	Tashan, Seyfi	Director	Turkish Foreign Policy Institute
UK	Vines, Alex	Research Director for Regional and Security Studies	Chatham House (The Royal Institute of International Affairs)
	Coker, Christopher	Professor, Head of the Dept of Inter-national Relations	London School of Economics and Political Science
Ukraine	Kopiyka, Valery	Director	Institute of International Relations of Kyiv University