



## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Conference on

### **« Turkey and the EU: 2004 and beyond »**

3 and 4 October 2003,  
Luxembourg

#### **Abstract**

In association with the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute (TFPI) of the Bilkent University in Ankara, the Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies (LIEIS) organised a conference on “Turkey and the EU: 2004 and beyond” on 3 and 4 October 2003 in Luxembourg. This conference took place at a time when the political debates on Europe focus on the future constitution and on the forthcoming Eastern enlargement scheduled for May 2004. There seems to be as yet little general awareness that no later than December 2004 the EU will take a decision on whether to open formal accession negotiations with Turkey. If the EU does, then it will be the task of the (then newly appointed) European Commission and of the Luxembourg Presidency in the first semester of 2005 to take up this issue.

The question of Turkey has so far been largely confined to national reactions, for example in Germany where the current government seems to be in favour of Turkey’s accession to the EU, while the opposition rejects the idea of full membership. Even when the President of the Convention on the Future of Europe and former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing declared that Turkey’s accession would mark the end of the EU, there was no genuine European-wide debate on the arguments in favour of or against Turkish accession.

In order to help raise public awareness and launch a systematic reflection on this question, the LIEIS convened over 40 participants, both decision-makers and academics from Turkey and EU member states. The aim of the conference was three-fold: first, analyse the relations between Turkey and the EU since the first Turkish demand for accession in 1959 up until the European Summit in Copenhagen in December 2002 where the criteria for opening

negotiations were laid down. Secondly, define the political, economic, geo-strategic and cultural challenges which Turkey as well as the EU will face and the changes they will need to enact. Finally, reflect on the aims and the limits of Europe and relate the case of Turkey to a broader context in order to define the various logics underpinning the current debates and actions both in Turkey and in the EU.

A number of insights emerged in the course of the various discussion sessions. First, there has been real changes and progress in Turkey regarding EU accession. Both the current Turkish government and many parts of the Turkish administration favour membership and are willing and able to steer Turkey towards this objective. Second, the potential gains of Turkey's accession are important, not only for Turkey itself but also for the EU as a whole. There are economic and commercial benefits, and advantages related to Turkey's geo-political situation and role, especially for the relations of the EU with the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Black Sea and Central Asia. Turkey's accession would create and strengthen a genuine European South-Eastern European defence and security policy.

However, participants from both Turkey and EU member states highlighted a number of possible obstacles to Turkey's full membership, for instance the question of Cyprus, the question of implementation of human rights, the status of the military, as well as cultural issues. In this light, there is no clear perspective on whether formal accession negotiations will be opened and within which period they might be concluded. So Turkey's accession is and remains an open question, although it has never been more likely that Turkey will join the EU.

## **I. The general context surrounding Turkey's accession**

There was wide agreement that the question of full Turkish membership cannot and should not be disentangled from the wider question of European integration and EU enlargement. If formal accession negotiations are launched, Turkey would be an 'unusual' candidate country because its membership raises the question of the EU's relations to the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Black Sea and Central Asia. Turkish accession would also have implications far beyond economic and trade issue, since the EU's international role would be profoundly altered (A. Clesse, Director, LIEIS). There is also European recognition that the benefits and the opportunities of Turkish membership have never been as positive as today, not least because economic and political gains would be mutual (C. Brewin, Senior Reader in International Relations, Keele University).

Turkish participants stressed the magnitude and scope of change in Turkey. Turkey's progress is not only on paper but real and can be verified because it concerns constitutional and legal changes. So the European Commission, before it takes any decision about opening formal accession negotiations, should put in place a screening mechanism that is apt to measure the extent to which Turkey complies with the Copenhagen criteria (S. Tashan, President, TFPI). Changes in Turkey include a change in mentality on the part of the wider Turkish administration to implement and drive forward the reform process, and also the awareness of the importance of decentralisation, since the EU lays increasing importance upon the regions (A. Eralp, Professor of International Relations, Middle East Technical University Ankara).

There has also been a cultural shift in Turkey, away from the idea that the West (Europe and/or the USA) are seeking to divide up Turkey towards the idea that there is a genuine engagement and that, for the first time in its history, the EU is prepared to give Turkey a chance to prove itself. All Turkish participants insisted on the fact that the EU

should support the reform process and that the perspective of opening accession negotiations is crucial for the future of reforms in Turkey (K. Kirisci, Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Bogaziçi University, Istanbul).

## **II. The relations between the EU and Turkey until 2003 and beyond**

### **1. The position of the European Commission and Turkish perceptions**

There was also wide agreement that the decision on whether to open negotiations on full Turkish membership in the EU is – and must be – political. There is and can be no scientific way of measuring progress in Turkey or of assessing the pros and cons. The European Commission has been positively surprised by the speed and depth of reforms in Turkey since the victory of the AKP in the general elections on 3 November 2002. For the first time there seems to be a government in power both willing and able to initiate and drive through a genuine reform process. The progress has been such that there remain but a few differences between Turkish and EU legislation. So the Commission's attention is on the central question of implementation. In any case, Turkey's current reform process is only the beginning of a long complicated way towards negotiations and possibly accession. This is why there can be no earlier verdict on whether to start accession negotiations (M. Ruete, Director responsible for Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria, DG Enlargement, European Commission).

From the Turkish perspective, the process of Turkey's accession has been long and strenuous and a positive decision to start negotiations is over-due, because Turkey has been part of the European project since the beginning, e.g. as a founding member of the Council of Europe. Turkey has also proved to be a reliable committed partner and ally, e.g. as part of the OECD and of NATO. For some time now, preceding the victory of the AKP, Turkey has undertaken major efforts to converge with the EU and to comply with EU legislation (O. Aksoy, former Turkish Ambassador, Board Member, TFPI). To join the EU is the logical, natural outcome of this long process of cooperation, convergence and progressive compliance (R. Arim, former Turkish Ambassador, Board Member, TFPI).

### **2. Possible obstacles and difficulties related to Turkish accession**

A number of participants from EU member states drew attention to the various forms of resistance within the EU vis-à-vis Turkey's accession. The question of immigration and integration was at the centre of controversial debates. One position is that many Turkish immigrants do not respect national or EU rights and obligations, since they elevate certain (frequently religious) practices above the law. Consequently, they remain ghettoised and refuse to become part of European societal life. As a result and in the face of a lack of political debate, a vast majority of EU citizens are opposed to enlargement: for instance, in Germany opposition to Turkish accession might be as high as 70-90%. (L. Rühl, Professor, Cologne University).

Other participants argued that the opposition to enlargement is real and deeply engrained but that under the leadership of the European Commission and of national governments, European populations could be persuaded that it is mutually beneficial for Turkey to join. There is no natural inherent hostility on the part of Christian Democrats to Turkey's accession. Instead, they share with the AKP an interest in, and concern for, the reality of religion (C. F. Nothomb, former Belgian Foreign Minister, Chairman, European

Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation, Brussels). In any case, Europe has long ceased to be a Christian society and needs to shed this myth and accept the fact that it is a consumer and supermarket society where religion is largely absent from the public realm (M. Palmer, former Director General, European Parliament).

Yet others argued that most Turkish immigrants respect EU laws and make efforts to become integrated, not least because practices such as honorary killings and forced marriages are prohibited and severely punished by Turkish law (S. Ocaktan, President, Islamic Cultural Centre, Luxembourg). Rather than laying the exclusive blame on immigrants, it is EU member states and the EU itself which have to provide more opportunities for integration, e.g. by facilitating access to citizenship and improving employment provisions (A. Pabst, Cambridge University and Researcher, LIEIS).

The point is that the EU needs to learn how to deal with more diverse and dynamic populations (A. Steinherr, Professor; Chief Economist, European Investment Bank). EU member states also should associate Turkish NGOs to the process of policy implementation aimed at enhancing integration, as the successful experience of Sweden demonstrates (A. Söderman, Swedish Ambassador, Luxembourg). There were also warnings not to confound problems related to first-generation immigration with the integration issue as such, since many difficulties stem from a lack of linguistic adaptation, which usually disappears in the second generation (S. Vaner, Professor, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris).

The EU has also recognised the advances made by Turkey in relation to problematic practices like honour killings and forced marriages. The Turkish authorities not only have introduced lengthy prison sentences for authors of such crimes but also prosecute them systematically. There is confidence that this will continue and intensify, because Turkey admits that it would have to take the blame for the failure to secure accession negotiations. So as long as the EU does not change the 'rules of the game', the trust between both sides that has been hard won will support the reforms in Turkey (A. Missir di Lusignano, Desk officer Turkey, DG Enlargement, European Commission). In response, Turkish participants explained that there is no single model of democratisation, human rights or integration and that Turkey will find its own path towards democracy and the peaceful co-existence of minorities. The EU could choose to sustain these efforts by granting Turkey candidate status and by raising substantially financial aid to Turkey (S. Tashan).

### **III. The arguments in favour of and against Turkey's accession**

#### **1. The geo-political case for full Turkish membership**

Turkish participants drew attention to the fact that Turkey has been a reliable ally as part of NATO and that it has a long history and tradition of geo-politics and of dealing with 'hard security' issues (A. Eralp). It was also said that EU had a lot to learn from Turkey's geo-political experience, in particular on questions of conflict-prevention and resolution. So Turkey would be an asset and an advantage if and when the EU comes to engage in a more pro-active foreign, defence and security policy. There was also emphasis on the potential benefits of Turkey's relations with the Northern tier (Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq). This experience is likely to benefit the EU, which has only recently turned to foreign, defence and security policy issues and which is struggling to devise common positions and to intervene in conflict scenarios such as the Middle East (D. Sezer, Professor of International Relations, Bilkent University, Ankara)

It was further argued that the EU has too long misread and underestimated the importance of Turkey, thinking that Turkey protects Europe's South-Eastern flank and provides some bridge to the Middle East and Central Asia. Rather than being peripheral, Turkey has been and will be pivotal to any European foreign, defence and/or security policy: over 130 out of 150 crisis scenarios for NATO directly involve Turkey; the current triangle formed by the EU, Turkey and the USA favours the latter two at the expense of the former – the EU is the 'weakest link' in such a configuration. So the EU has an unambiguous interest in Turkey's geo-political weight. Turkey's accession would propel the EU to the forefront of global geo-politics and endow it with a genuine strategic concept and policy in South-Eastern Europe. But the EU should also be aware that its interest in a strategic partnership is higher than Turkey's and that Turkey's allegiance is conditional on the defence of its own, legitimate geo-political interests. Any intermediate alternative would only be viable if there was a clear timetable and clear objectives (L. Rühl).

It was also argued that the idea to create a partnership that goes beyond the existing association agreement but falls short of full membership is paradoxical, if not contradictory. For it constitutes an important endorsement of the Turkish military, which – on a political level – is thought of as one of the major obstacles to Turkey's accession. It is also to take a rather impoverished view of the potential of Turkey and misses the importance of engaging in closer dialogue with Turkey on the question of relations with Greece and Cyprus (S. Vaner).

## 2. The economic case for and against Turkey's accession

There was wide agreement on the potential economic gains of Turkish accession. Among the main Turkish arguments was the claim that Turkey has pursued closer economic cooperation and integration since at least the 1963 Ankara agreement. At that time Turkey made unexpected progress to the point that the second step of economic cooperation was brought forward. But the first 'oil shock' of 1973 put an end to further economic ties, as the economies of the EEC stagnated and failed to generate sufficient demand for Turkish exports. However, recent economic progress in Turkey has been such that Turkey is the 16<sup>th</sup> largest economy in the world and is bound to fulfil the Maastricht criteria in about five years' time. This record justifies opening negotiations, at which point Turkey would qualify for substantial EU aid and therefore be able to support and enhance the economic reforms that it has been undertaking. Moreover, Turkey would be a very lucrative market for EU goods and a source of labour and natural resources (O. Morgil, Professor of Economics, Hacettepe University, Ankara).

Several participants from EU member states urged to take a long-term view of at least 20-30 years to assess the potential economic advantages of Turkish accession. Turkey's single most important benefit would be stable credible institutions and extensive private investment, including FDI. The EU would have a strong interest in labour mobility and the rejuvenation of European demography, in order to reduce the problem of 'ossification' (the expression is from the late Mancur Olson). Turkey would constitute a very lucrative consumer goods market (A. Steinherr).

However, it was also argued that the adjustment costs would be considerable (A. Steinherr) and that the overall economic strategy – neo-liberalism – might be misguided, because it has had grave negative effects on Turkey (as evinced by Turkey's recession in 2000-2001) and on the EU (the fiscal straightjacket and the monetary rigidity). The point about neo-liberalism is that it seems to have locked the world economy and the European

economies into a lower-growth path, with the result of lower investment, persistent high unemployment and all the related social costs (A. Pabst).

## **IV. The aims and limits of the EU with view to Turkish accession**

### **1. Lessons from history**

What does history tell us about the link between aims and limits? First, it is an illusion to think that the finality of the European integration process would progressively become clearer. Secondly, enlargement has so far led to the dilution of the integration process: the EEC was joined by countries more sceptical or even hostile to further integration, especially the UK but also some Scandinavian countries. Eastern enlargement was a missed opportunity to discuss the aims and limits of EU. Thirdly, the Convention on the Future of Europe has failed to produce sufficient changes to adapt the EU to take in the 10 Central and Eastern European countries and at the same time pursue further integration (A. Clesse).

So how can we think about the relation between aims and limits? First, the question is whether integration is – and should be – exclusively or predominantly economic or also political. Secondly, if the EU is about more than a free-trade zone, which it seems to be, then the question is the extent to which integration involves dimensions such as basic common rights and a common identity or whether the EU might even form a security or political community. Since the EU has repeatedly not lived up to any international or global challenge, another question is whether this can – or indeed should – be changed. A further question is what Turkey's role might be in clarifying the nature and extent of enlargement and integration. What does Turkey expect from full membership? Can the EU not learn from Turkey how to manage more heterogeneity and the rise of centrifugal forces that are and will be at work in the wake of Eastern enlargement? (A. Clesse)

### **2. How to conceptualise the relation between enlargement and integration?**

There were several attempts to conceptualise the question of the relations between aims and limits and integration and enlargement. According to the functionalist perspective, the economically-driven integration leads to progressive waves of enlargement, since economic theory shows that an increase in market size provides substantial opportunities for prosperity related to economies of scale, better allocation of resources and specialisation. While there are short-run adjustment costs, these are offset and outweighed by the medium- and long-run gains. These gains spill over into other areas of cooperation and therefore help sustain and enhance integration. One such area is regional cooperation, which Turkey is already practising and which it could put to very good use as part of the EU, with economically important regions like Iran, the Black Sea and Pakistan. Another area can be the fighting of organised crimes, which is a major threat to the EU. Yet another is security policy (O. Morgil). On this account, the EU's enlargement to Turkey does not stand in opposition to further integration.

According to the same functionalist perspective, much economic and other integration has already been achieved, especially in the light of European history. To say that the EU still falls short of a genuine federation is to recognise not only failure but also potential. The best way to achieve enlargement and further integration is to break away from a top-down, elitist approach and to adopt a bottom-up approach and to define clear rules. This would enable the EU to make a coherent case for extending a European free-trade zone to parts of North Africa



and to Russia without granting them full membership status. It would also enable the EU to say that for the sake of demographic equilibrium, Turkey's strongly growing population does not constitute an insurmountable obstacle and that the same applies for the Ukraine, even though there are open questions about the modalities of their accession. What is clear is that the EU is a club, which requires clear rules and which is open to all those who fulfil them and, concomitantly, closed to those who do not (A. Steinherr).

Another approach consists in analysing the logics which are at work, e.g. on the issue of international politics and conflict resolution. Three different logics can be distinguished: first, the Hobbesian account according to which conflict is inevitable and can be solved by force alone. Secondly, the Lockean approach which thinks that government and nation-states are and will remain the dominant players. Thirdly, a more Kantian account that argues for some sort of interdependence and civic cooperation in order to secure 'perpetual peace'. All three logics seem to be operative, since the intergovernmental (Lockean) method is best for armed conflict resolution. Yet at the same time it is widely believed that economic and civic cooperation are propitious to conflict prevention and resolution (K. Kirisci).

Yet another approach consists in analysing some of the dynamics that operate within the EU. For instance, enlargement is not about extending common solidarity to other poorer countries, but an exercise in national selfishness. For each enlargement has sparked – and will continue to do so – demands for compensation for the loss of aid from the ACP and the structural and regional funds. Turkey's accession, if and when it takes place, will be an unprecedented move for such compensation demands. So a realist perspective is required to make sense of how enlargement and integration are interrelated. One dimension that is bound to be of increasing relevance is the question of 'good neighbourhood policy'. If the EU decides to keep Turkey out, it will most likely behave like an empire 'in the making', a power that attempts to control what occurs around its borders: a Commission document states that 'we need to make sure we stay in control of migration flows'. Enlargement always raises the question of the possible threat of immigration and also of identity and is therefore – adversely – related to integration (M. Hirsch).

### **3. Some hypotheses and evidence about the present and future of the EU**

So the question is where the EU stands presently and what Turkish accession would entail. One hypothesis is that the phenomenon termed 'Euro-sclerosis' will set in and/or intensify, making any further integration impossible or highly unlikely or perhaps even dissolving some achievements. In turn, this raises the question of what difference Turkey might make to the EU, whether the size of Turkey matters, and how so, especially in the light of Turkey's own expectations (A. Clesse). There is at least one powerful argument in favour of this hypothesis: the resilience and apparent irreducibility of the nation-state and of national identities. This applies not only to (now long-standing) EU member states like the UK or Scandinavian countries which have prevented further integration in the past (M. Palmer), but also to some of the new-comers, especially Poland, which is unlikely ever to relinquish its hard-won national sovereignty (L. Rühl).

Another hypothesis is that enlargement will not eliminate possibilities for further integration, not least because there is already evidence for increasing integration, e.g. the emergence for the first time of a pan-European conscience and debate, in the run-up to the Iraq War, which is reflective of a certain rationality at work in the EU since its creation (C. Brewin). The EU has also been singularly successful at overcoming an elitist, imperial or

nationalist approach to international politics, not least because it was set up as a bulwark against German nationalism. Another argument in favour of the likelihood of further integration is the fact that the EU has resolved the perpetual tension between the need for continuous integration (otherwise the EU would be thrown off-track or even collapse) and the need for increasing flexibility in the face of enlargement. It has done so through the idea of subsidiarity and the recognition that a constitution is needed to set out who does what (C. Jenkins, Director for EU Affairs, Economist Intelligence Unit, London).

Overall, it was said that the EU has faced and will continue to face three major obstacles on the way to further enlargement and integration. First, the importance of national sovereignty in almost all areas of policy-making, with the exception of the economy. Secondly, the attachment to national foreign policy and the absence of a European tradition of pro-active foreign policy. Thirdly, the dependence on the USA for an effective defence and security policy (S. Tashan). The question then is whether the EU is capable of overcoming these obstacles and how Turkish accession might modify this.

## **V. Perspectives, questions and recommendations in relation to Turkish accession**

### **1. The importance to consider the cultural dimension of Europe**

It was argued that any analysis of the EU in general and of the question of Turkish accession in particular requires an approach that takes account of the cultural dimension. This dimension exceeds by far the single question of linguistic diversity. It is crucial not to misconstrue culture as a simplistic sort of ‘clash of civilisations’ or the hegemony of liberalism and the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama). Instead, culture is coextensive with other factors such as politics, economics, social issues and religion. One of the difficulties is to avoid – or overcome – Euro-centric notions and to come to a more sophisticated understanding of how culture operates, especially in the case of a Muslim society that is too frequently viewed through the prism of a certain form of Christianity, even if the idea of a Christian club is fast receding (S. Vaner).

One concrete measure to promote the cultural dimension in the study of Europe would be the creation of a European university. The main idea is to set up a serious educational programme capable of training people in a distinctly European perspective in order to foster mutual understanding and a common shared European identity. Rather than being an elite institution, it would be a broadly based university that would be open to all sections of society, through a system of bursaries funded by European institutions or private donors. The host country of such a university would only have to provide the infrastructure. Among the principal areas of study would be law (different legal traditions and the EU legal system), society, economics and business. The aim would be to build trans-national pan-European networks that help create a European society and politics (A. Steinherr).

### **2. The question of Cyprus**

There was a controversial debate over the question of Cyprus. It was argued that Cyprus, rather than being a token for Turkey in the negotiations with the EU, might turn out to be the major handicap for Turkish attempts to join the EU. This is because the situation is clear and it is the Turkish Cypriote side and Turkey that refuse to comply. The legal situation is that the



*acquis communautaire* will have to apply to the whole of the island of Cyprus when it joins the EU in May 2004.

The political situation is also clear: the Annan plan that envisages a bi-communitarian and bi-zonal federation with a single federal government, which represents Cyprus on the international stage, is widely accepted by the international community. But it is being torpedoed by the Turkish Cypriote leader Denktash. The risk is that in the absence of any accord before May 2004, Turkey will be formally in breach of some of the central rules of the EU, e.g. the non-recognition of an EU member state, non-admission of Cypriote citizens, ships, etc. But there is nevertheless reason for cautious optimism: despite reluctance on the part of the Turkish ‘deep state’ and Denktash, the opposition parties might win elections scheduled for 14 December 2003 and conclude negotiations prior to May 2004 (J. Poos, former Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, Rapporteur on Cyprus for the European Parliament).

Others opposed this reading of the situation and argued in favour of a less biased view on the part of the European Parliament. This uneven-handed approach has in fact been counter-productive, because it has contributed to Turkish nationalism and therefore stirred up tensions rather than solved them. The European Parliament also needs to recognise the legitimacy of the Turkish Cypriote leadership and the reasons for which Denktash has been elected for such a long time (C. Brewin). Some Turkish participants declared that the ‘Annan Plan’ simply was not perfect and that it was legitimate for the Turkish Cypriote side to refuse to subscribe to it in its present form.

It was also said that Turkey’s situation was generally disadvantageous, e.g. in relation to the current operation of the Customs Union, which has caused adverse economic effects. Finally, it was pointed out that there needs to be much more mutual understanding before Turkey can accept a final solution for Cyprus, above all the importance of recognising the differences and idiosyncrasies of a Muslim society. It was also stressed that there is sufficient scope for agreement, not least because there are already important efforts to promote dialogue, mutual understanding and common positions (Z. Akçam).

### **3. Some concrete policy recommendations**

In conclusion, the participants formulated a number of concrete policy recommendations that are of interest to all political and socio-economic actors. On Cyprus, it was said that the question of return and property issues, which are not addressed sufficiently by the ‘Annan Plan’, can be dealt with as follows: to link these issues to the membership of Turkey so as to transform this into a progressive process, rather than precipitating any final settlement. Given the current speed of reforms, Turkey can become a full member of the EU within the next 7 or 8 years. What is crucial to this process is to consolidate and enhance the mutual trust that has been built up by setting a date for commencing formal negotiations. These should focus not only on Turkey’s compliance with EU laws and regulation but also on increasing and extending economic cooperation for the duration of the negotiations as to sustain the effort and to underline the mutual benefits of closer ties. This includes a critical assessment of the operation of the Customs Union.

Two main domains remain to be resolved that have not been profoundly challenged by Turkey’s efforts to bring about compliance with the *acquis communautaire*: Turkish democracy and human rights. The problem is how to combine EU standards and ideals with the particular reality of Turkey, including its long history and its different culture. But it was also stressed that the history of European integration – for instance in the case of Greece,



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Spain and Portugal – has demonstrated that the perspective and the reality of accession is the most effective engine to drive forward the process of democratisation and of implementing and practising human rights (S. Tashan).

A. Pabst  
October 2003

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The Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies (LIEIS), in association with  
the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute of the Bilkent University Ankara

Conference on

## Turkey and the EU: 2004 and beyond

*3 and 4 October 2003*

*Bâtiment Jean Monnet (M6), Luxembourg*

### Programme

#### **Friday 3 October 2003**

- 09.00-10.30 **Session 1:** The relations between the EU and Turkey until 2003
- 10.30-11.00 Coffee break
- 11.00-12.30 **Session 2:** Possible development of the EU after the enlargement of 2004
- 12.30-14.30 Lunch
- 14.30-16.00 **Session 3:** The political, economic, strategic and cultural arguments *in favour* of Turkish accession
- 16.00-16.30 Coffee break
- 16.30-18.00 **Session 4:** The political, economic, strategic and cultural arguments *against* Turkish accession

#### **Saturday 4 October 2003**

- 09.00-10.30 **Session 5:** The aim of Europe
- 10.30-11.00 Coffee break
- 11.00-12.30 **Session 6:** The limits of Europe
- 12.30-14.30 Lunch
- 14.30-16.00 **Session 7:** The perspectives of the Turkish accession to the EU
- 16.00-16.30 Coffee break
- 16.30- 18.00 **Session 8:** Conclusion and recommendations for concrete measures

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The Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies (LIEIS), in association with  
the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute of the Bilkent University Ankara

Conference on

## Turkey and the European Union: 2004 and beyond

*3 and 4 October 2003*

*Bâtiment Jean Monnet, Luxembourg*

### List of participants

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**Aksoy, Oktay**, former Ambassador; Board Member of the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute, Bilkent University, Ankara  
**Allegrezza, Serge**, Director, STATEC, Luxembourg  
**Apelbaum-Pidou, Ingrid**, Ambassador of Switzerland, Luxembourg  
**Arim, Resat**, former Ambassador; Board Member of the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute, Bilkent University, Ankara  
**Brewin, Christopher**, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Keele University, UK  
**Clesse, Armand**, Director, Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies  
**Delvaux-Stehres, Mady**, Deputy, Parliament of Luxembourg  
**Eralp, Atila**, Professor, Chair, Department of International Relations, Middle East, Technical University, Ankara  
**Goyenc, Fulya**, Vice President, Head of Overseas Network Coordination, Turkiye Garanti Bankasi AS, Istanbul  
**Gümüstekin, Tulû**, Director General, Corporate & Public Strategy Advisory Group, Brussels  
**Hirsch, Mario**, Political Scientist; Editor-in-chief, d'Lëtzebuerger Land, Luxembourg  
**Jenkins, Charles**, Director for EU affairs, Economist Intelligence Unit, London  
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**von Kunitzki, Norbert**, President, Centre Universitaire de Luxembourg  
**Macris, Panayotis**, Ambassador of Greece, Luxembourg  
**Missir di Lusignano, Alessandro**, Desk Officer Turkey, Directorate General Enlargement, European Commission, Brussels  
**Morgil, Orhan**, Professor, Chair, Department of Economics, Hacettepe University, Ankara  
**Nothomb, Charles Ferdinand**, Chairman, European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation, Brussels  
**Ocaktan, Servet**, President of the Islamic Cultural Centre of Luxembourg  
**Özdemir, Hüseyin**, Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of Turkey, Luxembourg  
**Pabst, Adrian**, researcher, University of Cambridge, UK  
**Palmer, Michael**, former Director General, European Parliament, Luxembourg  
**Poos, Jacques**, former Minister of Foreign Affairs; Member of the Foreign and European Affairs and Defence Committee of the European Parliament, Luxembourg  
**Postolache, Tudorel**, Ambassador of Romania, Luxembourg

**Ruete, Matthias**, Director responsible for Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria, Directorate General Enlargement, European Commission, Brussels  
**Rühl, Lothar**, Professor emeritus, University of Cologne  
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**Söderman, Agneta**, Ambassador of Sweden, Luxembourg  
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**Tümer, Erdal**, Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg  
**Vaner, Semih**, Professor, Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales; Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris

### **Observers**

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**Karaca, Kayhan**, correspondent, Chain NTV Turkey, Strasbourg  
**Leloglu, Deuygu**, journalist, Brussels  
**de Lhoneux, Etienne**, Secretary General, Central Bank of Luxembourg  
**Man Ciprian, Teodor**, Centre for Population, Poverty and Public Policy Studies (CEPS), Luxembourg  
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**Ocaktan, Aydin**, chief executive officer, Ideanomix, Luxembourg  
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