Institut d'Etudes Européennes
et Internationales du Luxembourg

Luxembourg Institute for European
and International Studies

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Summer School

Telos, Ethos, Demos and the Future of the European Union

20-26 August 2007
Vama Veche, Romania

Introduction

In association with the Black Sea University Foundation of Mangalia and the European Cultural Centre of Bucharest, the Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies (LIEIS) organised a seminar on 'Telos, Ethos, Demos and the Future of the European Union' from 20 to 26 August 2007 in Vama Veche, Romania.

This seminar is part of a long-term project of summer courses involving students from the wider Black Sea area and from neighbouring countries. Past topics in this series have included the nature of conflicts in the international system, conceptual and practical issues in relation to European and world security problems and, more recently, the question of mentalities and the quest for European values.

The objective of this seminar was to have an open and frank debate about the relevance of the notion of telos, ethos and demos for the future of the European integration and enlargement process. The purpose was to think collectively about core topics and key issues, without any a priori assumptions, prejudice or stereotypes. Rather than having long presentations, this was a brain-storming exercise with a clear focus on interdisciplinary concepts and theories. The ambition of the organisers was to develop new insights and ideas that are different from the conventional talk in Brussels and Bucharest, where the ruling elites are all too often unaware of the real problems which confront ordinary people and minorities like the Roma, or the peripheral role of parts of Central and Eastern Europe within the EU.

As in previous years, the seminar brought together a number of lecturers from across Europe and about 20 students from the Black Sea area. The group of lecturers was as follows: Dr. Armand Clesse, Director of the LIEIS; Professor Mircea Malitza, Founder and President of the Black Sea University and Vice-President of the European Cultural Centre; Victor

Neuman, Professor at the West University of Timişoara; Professor Gerhard Michael Ambrosi, Jean Monnet Chair in European Economic Policy at the University of Trier. The group of students included a wide range of different levels and profiles: some final-year undergraduates, others doing Masters degrees, yet others PhD candidates and several who have studied abroad and with professional experience. Mostly they originated from Romania, but there were also participants from Armenia, Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria and Albania.

In line with the topic, the seminar was divided into three parts: first, telos; second, ethos and, third, demos. This report does not outline the presentations given by the lecturers or the questions posed by the students in a chronological order. Rather, it seeks to provide an overview of the discussions and to highlight the main questions and conclusions that emerged from the lively exchange of ideas. In addition to the nine plenary sessions, the students debated in three separate working groups. The results of these debates are summarised in three reports which can be found in the Appendix.

I. A Brief Outline of the Topic

In his introductory remarks, Armand Clesse began by asking if there is any logical sequence between telos, ethos and demos. He explained that the notion of telos is of Greek origin and refers to finality, final purpose, end or goal. The fundamental question is whether it makes sense to use this term in relation to the EU. Can we say that the EU is essentially an area of prosperity based on free trade and the free movement of people and capital? Or does it have a political end? If so, what is that end, who determines it and how?

Likewise, he wondered whether there is something like an ethos that is specific to the Union. Is the EU really about values and an ethical dimension? What will become of the Charter? Is this catalogue sufficient or should it be more ambitious? What about the limits of life, abortion and euthanasia, and all the bioethical questions in relation to human reproduction and stem cell research? Should the EU interfere in questions about genetic engineering and bio-politics? Or should these topics be left to the prerogative of the nation-state in the name of the principle of subsidiarity – whatever can be better done at the level of the nation should be done at the level of the nation-state?

Finally, what about demos in relation to the Union? Is there sufficient democracy at the level of the EU, inside the institutions and among the member-states? Numerous critics accuse the Union of having a democratic deficit. In part, this criticism has led to wide-ranging reforms of the European Parliament (EP), *inter alia* by introducing direct elections and giving it control over the activities of other core institutions, above all the European Commission. It is true that the strengthening of the EP is one of the few noteworthy features of the Lisbon Reform Treaty, but does it truly represent the 'will of the people'? Would a further strengthening of the EP be at the expense of the Commission? What about the Council of Ministers?

Beyond the European institutional arrangement, the concept of demos raises wider questions of legitimacy and sovereignty. Where is more democracy needed most, at the level of the people or also at that of the nations? How can we achieve a balance of interests, a bargaining process that satisfies some of the interests of the core constituents? The French and Dutch No to the Constitutional Treaty could be viewed as a revolt of the people against a bureaucratic

behemoth that is removed from popular concerns. But was it more democratic to hold a referendum? Who should decide in the EU: people, member-states, technocrats or a group of wise men? Who decides, how and on what? Is there not a need to agree on the modality of ratifying new treaties? If referenda are the chosen means, would it not make sense to hold a referendum on the same day in all the member-states? What about individual member-states, small (Malta) or big (UK), old (France) or new (Poland)? Should they all carry the same weight? Is there not something like a responsibility of each and every member-state for the well-being of the Union as a whole?

In short, the topic of telos, ethos and demos raises a number of fundamental conceptual and practical questions that are not always adequately addressed by the existing theories or by the decision- and policy-makers.

Mircea Malitza argued that telos is more important than the other two terms, in that it denotes 'ends' and as such indicates the direction and purpose of countries, societies and cultures. Telos says more about human beings than 'who they are'; it focuses on 'what they become' and 'how they evolve'. Moreover, to start with the objectives is more relevant in decision-making models than other considerations. This is true at the interpersonal level as well as in business and international relations. One question that is raised by the concept of telos is the nature and number of guiding principles. From a mathematical perspective, it seems to be the case that ten commandments are already excessive and that seven is preferable. The ideal number seems to range between 5 or 7 principles, like in some world religions such as Buddhism or Confucianism.

Another question that follows from reflections on telos is, according to M. Malitza, the basis for pursuing common objectives and the required resources. What is the end of people coming together and cooperating? Among the indispensable resources, there are shared skills and expertise in order to deal with challenges and solve problems, because it is easier to promote personal interests in association with others, and that requires clear identification of objectives. To speak of interests is to speak of survival, so biology is or should be central to any theories about telos or finality. Indeed, many communities, ethnic groups and cultures have disappeared, whereas others have survived: what are the conditions of possibility for survival? Rather than following the old theories of realism and idealism or talking about feelings, values, etc., what must be explained is the existence and operation of separate human entities, which is why it is necessary to begin with anthropology. Against false symbols and empty images, it is crucial to engage with reality as it is by measuring individual entities and working out the system within which they operate.

A. Clesse contended that this sort of approach is little more than a variant of Marxist materialism which is philosophically primitive because it lacks that which makes humans truly *homo sapiens* – the spiritual dimension, the mystical, and the metaphysical. M. Malitza defended himself against the charge of Marxism and described his theory as scientific – there is a transcendental dimension; of course, there is something that exceeds the limits of the human mind, but that excess is natural and does not warrant a metaphysical or theological explanation. Natural science is and should be the basis for the humanities and social sciences. That is the best hope for human and cultural progress.

Some of these theoretical and methodological issues framed the subsequent presentations and discussions. For A. Clesse, what is important to bear in mind is that each theory is governed by a set of assumptions that are not self-evident or self-explanatory. To think critically is to question the presuppositions that inform theories, to structure evidence and to determine conclusions. Instead of asserting subjective opinions, it is more rational to adopt a more dubitative mode and to identify and examine questions from different angles – an approach that goes back to the philosophical tradition of 'perspectivism', e.g. in the works of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer.

II. The Telos of the European Integration Process: 1957 and 2007

The first part of the seminar focused on the notion of telos and was divided into two sections: first, the finality of the European integration process in 1957 and in 2007 and, second, the finality of the European enlargement process and the political aspirations of the wider Europe. A. Clesse launched the discussions on the first section by explaining that the Messina process which culminated in the 1957 Treaty of Rome came on the back of some major setbacks, above all the rejection of the European Defence Community on 30 August 1954 by the French National Assembly. In the post-war years starting with the Pleven Plan of 1950, a number of European states envisaged the creation of a European Political Community (EPC) and a European Defence Community (EDC), both with a very strong supranational element. However, in France the fear of losing an independent French national army prevailed over the fear of a German military resurgence. In fact, the failure of the EDC was in large part due to domestic French political developments: the rise of two new more Euro-sceptic parties which had entered French parliament, the Gaullists and the Communists, and the decline of two more pro-European parties, the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire* (MRP) of Robert Schuman (1886-1963) and the *Parti Radical*. Coupled with the death of Stalin in 1953, the humiliating defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and the refusal of Britain to participate, the EDC and the EPC were doomed.

Western Europe's telos of the late 1940s and 1950s was to prevent another war among its nations and to consolidate peace, stability, reconstruction and prosperity (linked to the Marshall Plan, which encouraged cooperation among the Europeans). This process raised questions about whether there should be an independent strong defence and security cooperation. What would be the implications for relations with the USA and the existence of NATO (created in 1949)? Would a European security and defence identity develop within or outside the existing NATO structures?

Already in 1957, the ambitions were much lower because the common military, security and defence plans had failed so miserably. Something more modest was now envisaged: based on the European Coal and Steal Community, the aim was now to intensify and extend economic cooperation and over time to create an ever closer union, which sounds ambitious but is rather vague. Taken together, this marked the transition from a federalist vision for Europe to a functionalist project.

The founder of functionalism was David Mitrany (1888-1975). He argued that countries have needs and interests which are partly conflicting and partly overlapping. This requires careful and selective cooperation in a number of specific areas. In terms of European politics, Pierre

Uri (1911-1992) was perhaps the main architect of this approach. His work certainly influenced Jean Monnet (1888-1979), who concluded that it was crucial to keep politics out of economics and that Europe's best hope for peace and stability was consensus-based cooperation and gradual integration.

These remarks were followed by an extensive discussion. Gerhard Michael Ambrosi argued that functionalism was more of a utopia than a theory, in that it was predicated on the premise that the state would wither away as a result of specific organisations and integrated fields. The aim of functionalism was to overcome hypertrophied nationalism and that is one of the reasons why Jean Monnet adopted it. A. Clesse added that Ernst B. Haas (1924-2003) and other theorists such as Philippe Schmitter (b. 1936) thought that functionalism was too narrow and required a larger basis, leading them to develop the theory of neo-functionalism based on the idea of spill-over effects from economic cooperation to political integration. However, the rise of functionalism and neo-functionalism did not put an end to federalism. For example, Altiero Spinelli (1907-1986), one of the founders of the federal movement, became a Commissioner, and other federalists made important contributions to the political debate and the policy-making process of the late 1950s and 1960s.

One question that came out of the discussion on rival models of integration was about the conceptual difference between functionalism and federalism. A. Clesse explained that functionalism is incremental, based on a method of trial-and-error and piecemeal social engineering, almost in a purely mechanistic way – a sort of 'government of things', where things are virtually self-regulating and 'operate' without any ideological interference. By contrast, federalism is about important step chances and a politically framed holistic vision, akin to the 'big bang' theory. Two strands can be distinguished: first, that of Carl Friedrich who developed the concept of 'constitutional revolution' and, second, that of Amitai Etzioni (b. 1929) who advocated a more legalistic approach. Another approach that was important was pluralism, invented by Karl Deutsch (1912-1992) who coined the term 'security community'.

More recently, the expanding field of European studies has focused more on sub-areas of European policy-making and less on systemic theorisation. Except perhaps for inter-governmentalism, a theory associated with the work of Andrew Moravcsik who emphasises the importance of cooperation among member-states at the intergovernmental level rather than integration at the supranational level. Inter-governmentalism is not just descriptive but also prescriptive because it eschews lofty aims in 'high politics' in favour of concrete action in 'low politics'. A. Clesse concluded his summary of some of the main models by asking whether in 2007 the EU should not rethink the foundations and finalities of the integration process and whether it must not clarify the very meaning of Europe, beyond the confines of the EU. What is sound and what is feasible for Europe and the EU in 2007 and in future?

M. Malitza contended that the opposite of functionalism is not necessarily federalism but rather structuralism. In the past, the federalist attempt was less about a balance between different levels – the local, the regional, the national and the supranational – than it was about creating a centralised, vertical bureaucratic super-state. As such, it came much closer to a form of structuralism. By contrast, the functionalist idea was to set up networks of different actors who cooperate across a wide range of horizontal functions. This made functionalism more naturally adapted to the complexity of Europe and its nations.

III. Finality and Enlargement: Possible Political Aspirations in a Wider Europe

At the outset of the second section of the part on telos, A. Clesse asked whether the EU can perhaps be described as a 'community of fate/destiny' (*Schicksalsgemeinschaft*) or as a 'community of will' (*Willensgemeinschaft*), in the tradition of Oswald Spengler, Jacob Burckhart, Ferdinand Tönnies (who in 1887 published an influential book called *Community and Society* [*Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*]). He briefly turned to the history of Western Europe's relations with the rest of Europe, the USA and the world in order to shed light on the finality of the European enlargement process. The starting point was the issue of defence and security. First of all, the dominant paradigm during the Cold War was that of Extended Deterrence and Assured Destruction. Second, now that the former enemy – the Soviet Union – has disappeared from the global geo-political scene, does the EU and the West have a new foe against which to define their security and defence interests? So-called global terrorism? More generally, are external threats sufficient to generate an internal sense of solidarity and collective defence?

Third, if neither France nor the UK is prepared to surrender their nuclear force to a common European defence identity, is there any realistic chance of an independent European defence capability without an independent nuclear force? How relevant are nuclear weapons in Europe, the 'transatlantic community' and the world? Fourth, despite the end of the Cold War, the reduction of the Western nuclear arsenal has been contentious: just as the Reagan administration engaged in re-armament by launching the programme called 'Star Wars', so the George W. Bush administration is seeking to establish an anti-ballistic missile shield in the Czech Republic and Poland, allegedly to protect the West from attacks by 'rogue states' such as Iran.

The discussion with the students led to an important conceptual clarification – the difference between collective security and collective defence. As A. Clesse explained, collective security is about an international organisation that ensures security among its members, e.g. the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, formerly the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe or CSCE which goes back to the Helsinki process that began in 1975). By contrast, collective defence is defined in relation to an external threat, e.g. NATO in relation to the Warsaw Pact. Finally, cooperative security is another concept and model that was not prominent during the Cold War but may become relevant in the post-Cold War era.

The second issue which was debated was the telos of the European integration process, an issue that concerns mainly national sovereignty and foreign policy. A. Clesse suggested that the recent additions to the EU were accepted *à contre-cœur* and that some of the new members now stand accused of being trouble shooters, e.g. Poland at the time of the twin brothers Lech and Jaroslaw Kaczyński. More fundamentally, what is currently going on in Brussels and the national capitals is a blame game about blocking 'old Europe' from further integration in the realm of the common foreign, security and defence policy. But since the concept of telos is not used by the EU, is it not perhaps preferable to adopt a minimalist approach, keeping things going and thereby preventing stasis or stagnation?

On the other hand, is the EU not in grave danger? Are we not witnessing a process of surreptitious fragmentation, masquerading as '*à la carte*', opt-outs and flexible arrangements?

Is this the end of the venture or an intermediary phase between the original *élan* and a new dynamic that will emerge, once the 27 members have gelled into a more coherent and convergent union? Even though there might be contrary tendencies, is it not undeniable that the chance to do something substantive was missed at the beginning and also more recently, thus leaving the Union in a situation of decay from which it cannot escape – a slow unravelling towards a simple free-trade area? Is there enough inbuilt flexibility in the EU to confront the new challenges, both internal and external, economic and geopolitical? M. Malitza wondered how the EU can call itself a global actor with such slow economic growth and such fast demographic decline (ageing population, slow birth rates, etc.). He suggested that the students write down and discuss the EU's most important ten achievements and ten failures. This idea was taken up and fed into the working group discussions (cf. Appendix I-III).

In the subsequent discussions, A. Clesse reverted to the question about the nature of the European enlargement process and distinguished between a teleological and a pragmatic approach. His contention was that after the debacle of the EDC and the EPC, the governing elites in Europe abandoned any serious discussion of Europe's telos and adopted a pragmatic approach aimed at concrete cooperation based on well-defined overlapping interests. Even after the establishment of the single market in 1985, the creation of the Union in 1992, the introduction of the Euro in 1999 and eastern enlargement in 2004, the EU lacks any debate about its being and its becoming. Which member-state is effectively discussing the EU's telos in general or in any specific policy area? This poverty of collective debate raises the question of whether the Union needs something like a vanguard – a group of pioneers that can offer a teleological vision and propel the Union toward, beyond the current paralysis that is affecting not only the integration but also the enlargement process (a phenomenon that A. Clesse termed 'enlargement fatigue' after the 'enlargement mess').[1]

However, one of the pillars of the Rome Treaty and the entire endeavour is the ideal of a balanced development in which all member-states participate equally. In the long-term the goal is to achieve convergence and to form a genuine union with equal standards of living and shared ideas about a common future. But now there are numerous voices that question this ethos and the telos that is implicit in it: some member-states will simply not catch up and remain secondary, on the periphery – not in a geographical but in an economic, social and political sense. If this is true, does that undermine the principle of enlargement or simply question the modalities of the accession process?

The questions and remarks by a number of students as well as the subsequent discussions raised a number of key questions, some conceptual and others more policy-focused. First of all, how to avoid confusion between the Union's fundamental telos, specific policy goals and strategies to implement them? Second, is it not necessary to distinguish between two rival conceptions of telos – one where telos is open-ended and dynamic and the other where telos is fixed and static. The former conception may be more appropriate for the late modern or post-modern world, whereas the latter was part of the modern era. Third, is it not preferable to talk about telos, ethos and demos in reverse order – the demos is the solidarity between Europe's citizens that leads to a common ethos which in turn enables the pursuit of a shared telos?

---

[1] Cf. Armand Clesse, 'This enlargement mess', *Europe's World*, Spring 2008, pp. 110-112.

Fourth, what are the costs of non-Europe, i.e. the costs of not joining or of leaving the Union – is there a decent life outside the EU? Fifth, how relevant is the ongoing debate between political scientists and economists about the meaning of accession and the possible need of setting limits to the EU's enlargement? Sixth, what is the interest of great powers such as Russia, the USA or China to see the EU become a global actor? Finally, is not the entire enlargement process constructed on the basis of a choice to 'take-it-or-leave-it', with no input from the candidate countries? Is it not a Brussels' diktat, in old colonial style, a friendly/hostile takeover by the EU, in the absence of any critical debate in the accession countries?

IV. Does the European Union Rest on Common Values? Should there be Common Values?

In the second part of the seminar, the discussions turned to the question of ethos. A. Clesse warned against the risk of conceptual confusion: values can be divided into primary fundamental values and secondary derived values, and values are not the same as rights or entitlements. For example, the sanctity of life is not at the same ethical level as democracy or the rule of law. Likewise, a list of basic rights is different from values of freedom and tolerance. He also made the point that collective consciousness includes conscience which is inherently ethical. In this sense, ethos is not just a matter of personal values that might or might not be shared with other individuals; rather, ethos concerns the person in relation to a community or society as a whole. Properly configured, ethos is holistic, not atomistic. Moreover, there is a clear difference between the spill-over effect of economics on politics and the spin-off effect of values (which is separate from the concept of side-product).

Applied to the case of the EU, a number of questions arise. First of all, is the Union a 'value community' (*Wertegemeinschaft, communauté de valeurs*)? Should it be one? Second, has the EU brought about a distinct quality of being and acting as part of a new inter-state and intra-state system? Third, is the EU any longer concerned with values or only material factors? Should it abandon values and focus on interests alone? Fourth, if history, territory and language have thus far divided people because they are predominantly national, does the EU require something like a vanguard to overcome this divide? Would this be both desirable and feasible? More concretely, should the contemporary return of religion and the parallel emergence of militant atheism (e.g. in recent books by Richard Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, and Christopher Hitchens, *God is Not Great*) be of any concern to the EU? Should the EU discuss politically sensitive and ideologically charged matters such as abortion or euthanasia? What about stem cell research and genetic manipulation?

In the discussion that followed these introductory remarks, a number of students intervened. Some wondered whether values are the consequence of interests or vice-versa. Historically, did economic cooperation spill over into politics and generate shared ethical ideals or was the initial cooperation based on common values? Others claimed that there are no specifically European values and that such values would have to be invented. Yet others spoke of the cultural diversity in post-industrial societies and questioned the point of stressing common ethical ideals. One important distinction that was drawn is that between legality and morality or legitimacy – but which one comes first?

A related point to consider is the changing role of the nation-state in the wake of globalisation and the pooling of sovereignty within the framework of the EU. Is it true to say that at the present time the nation-state has less influence on the socialisation of its people than in the modern area, when the formation of the nation-state was instrumental in the rise of bio-politics (Foucault)? Should the EU address this topic and related problems such as defining the foundations and finalities of life, human and animal (insofar as they are distinct)? Would an EU law on abortion make sense and be feasible? Should the EU venture into new realms or limit itself to its current prerogatives and competencies – enlarge domains or the political 'combat zones'?

The seminar group was divided on another fundamental question – the sequential relation between values and interests. Some argued that after the failure of the EDC and the EPC, the European integration was grounded in, and driven by, economic interests. As such, Europe differs from the USA in terms of the absence of a strong narrative around a common history and shared beliefs and ethical ideals. Others contended that Europe was already a community of people during the 1950s and early 1960s and that this community was based on values such as pragmatism, rationality, individualism, solidarity. It is social solidarity that differentiates Europe from the USA. G.M. Ambrosi remarked that one key difference between communism and capitalism is the mode of capital accumulation and ownership and that some European forms of capitalism such as the social market economy include a controlling element which is co-decision, i.e. workers' councils – a social provision which is now part of EU-wide legislation on company law. This can mitigate social conflict and promote solidarity.

Yet other students said that the advent of post-modernity marks the end of idealism and the sole pursuit of money and that the EU is no exception to this norm. In consequence, the Union needs values and they have to be constructed in order to hold people together – these values should include European history, the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, as well as the French Revolution. But there were some who disagreed, pointing out that liberty is a natural value and as such cannot be constructed artificially. Rather than identifying specific values, it is important to draw distinctions between fundamental ethical choices like individualism *vs.* collectivism and solidarity *vs.* egotism or egocentrism.

The second section on ethos focused on ethical standards and practices in relation to the EU. Some argued that the limits on EU powers to legislate about questions such as abortion and euthanasia are wrong, because as a political community the Union should decide on more than just economics and trade. Insofar as the roots of the European integration process go back to Christianity and the Christian faith is about respect for the person and therefore the pursuit of solidarity, the EU should discuss ethical questions. This led to a debate on religion. A. Clesse explained that Europe has been marked by the Christian tradition and the influence of the Church in relation to dignity, integrity and sanctity of life. The initial ethos of the post-war European integration process was largely Christian Catholic, as evinced by the Christian beliefs of the some of the most important protagonists, including Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Alcide De Gasperi and even Socialists like Paul-Henri Spaak. However, the French MRP disappeared, perhaps under the influence of the decline of religion in politics.

On this same topic, G.M. Ambrosi said that the Christian democratic tradition goes back to late 19th-century and early 20th-century politics, when the process of industrialisation and the mobilisation of the new urban proletariat led the Roman Catholic Church to address the fate

of capital and labour – Pope Leo XIII's encyclical *Rerum novarum*, published in 1890, remains a milestone in Catholic social teaching. The tradition was European, except in the run-up to and during the First World War when there was strong Catholic support for the nation and nationalism, e.g. French Catholicism in relation to the French Republic and Maréchal Ferdinand Foch (1851-1929).

When, how and why was this original ethos sidelined? Was enlargement to blame? What are the causes of secularisation? Is there a difference between the Catholic South and the Protestant North? How significant are regional differences within individual countries? What about eastern enlargement? The difference between Poland and Czech Republic would suggest that there is no single uniform trend, either towards a more secular or a more religious Europe. Whereas some might lament the lack of religious identity, it is also true that religion can be – and has been – used as way of shoring up group identity in the face of discrimination – e.g. the Portuguese in Luxembourg. All this raises broader conceptual questions, first of all the possible correlation between culture, religion and corruption. For example, how to explain the difference in the nature and level of corruption between, say, Scandinavia and Africa? Is it culture in general or religion in particular (e.g. Protestantism and Calvinism, making people more immune to corrupting influences, but Catholics less so)? What about the impact of religion on the economy?

G.M. Ambrosi asked which role the Orthodox Church played in bringing about European unification but also fuelling the flames of nationalism, e.g. in Romania but also in relation to Orthodox brethrens in Serbia. Some students responded by saying that the Orthodox Church in Serbia and elsewhere exhibited Caesaro-Papist tendencies (whereby the head of state appoints the head of the Church). Moreover, the Russian Orthodox Church inside Russia is close to the state, like during Soviet times, whereas the Russian Orthodox Church outside Russia is more critical. Until June 2007, they did not recognise each other. Other students claimed that in Croatia, religion was a factor of national unity during the 1990s – the Vatican was the first state to recognise the independence and sovereignty of the Croat nation in 1991. But it was also pointed out by A. Clesse that large parts of the Croatian Catholic Church had supported the Nazis and the Ustaše (or Ustashi) during the Second World War and that this legacy continued until the present day.

There was disagreement on the role of the Church in Romania. A number of students said that conflicts between Romania and Hungary are not based on religion, but on nation, ethnic identity and history, e.g. the Hungarian region in Romania, which is composed of part of Mures County and all of Harghita and Covasna, with Sfantu Gheorghe as capital. But G.M. Ambrosi argued that nationalism in the churches of Central and Eastern Europe comes from the Romantic ideology in the 19th century, when the religious and the civil elite assimilated the ideas of Hegel, Fichte, Schelling and Herder in order to create myths and mythology about their own national identity: Slovaks against Hungarians, Greeks against Turks, etc. If we are to create a greater European entity, it cannot be done on the basis of a neo-Romantic ideal; this is counter-productive and requires a civic alternative, based on values, not ethnic identity.

This requires a proper reading and understanding of Hegel, according to whom the state has several 'moments' in its historical unfolding and the idea of morality (*Sittlichkeit*) is more fundamental than that of ethnic group (*Volk*). Moreover, for G.M. Ambrosi, there are a number of different theological concepts that can enable us to think about religious identity.

There are also inter-confessional initiatives that promote peaceful co-existence, e.g. the second declaration of Snagov where religions played a decisive role in supporting Romania's process of accession to the EU.

A. Clesse asked whether Muslims should be associated to the debate on the future of Europe and, if so, how. He said that the Balkan experience, in particular that of the Bosnians, shows that religion pervaded and still pervades national consciousness, self-perception and perception of others. As such, religion is an important marker that cannot simply be eliminated from public discourse. Some students however warned that religions are easily instrumentalised by other forces – politics, ethnic identity, etc. – in order to defend particular interests and discriminate against minorities. The issue of discrimination led to further discussions. Some wondered whether economic wealth stands in negative correlation with discrimination, xenophobia and racism. Cases like Luxembourg or Flanders raise doubts about this thesis, as do Denmark and Sweden, Spain and Eastern Germany, as well as the Baltic States (where there is widespread discriminatory action against the Russian minority).

The seminar then turned to the question of minority rights. Several students argued that the EU should strengthen the provisions of minority rights. A. Clesse asked whether the Council of Europe is important or irrelevant. Some students from Romania replied that the historical role of the Council was to bring democracy to Romania and that it helped the country understand the problems faced by minorities. The Council is not just concerned with Europe but also with the international communities, and this has been recognised by some Muslim countries; as such the Council has a more international and inclusive role than the EU which has a more clearly delimited European vocation. Other students contended that there should not be any EU-wide standards on all these questions because European nations are historically and culturally too different and EU rules would make integration more difficult, not less so.

Another topic was the question about Europe's ethical specificity or lack thereof. A. Clesse wondered whether it is right to contrast and perhaps even oppose Western to Asian values or, more specifically, whether European (Protestant and Calvinist) are fundamentally different from Confucian values. But then what about India as compared with China? If there is something like the vitality of nations which can be explained in terms of a series of dependent and independent variables, where does ethos come into this? As an independent variable or a dependent variable? For example, is work ethos one of the main defining characteristics of Europe? Do people work less hard in some parts of Europe than others and if so, why? Is there a fundamental difference between Europe on the one hand and America and Asia on the other? Does ethos in general and work ethos in particular only encompass positive features? Should not corruption and nepotism, which are part of national mentality, be included?

Following Robert Putnam's book *Bowling Alone*, the question is how civil society changes so dramatically in such a short period of time, away from mutual trust and towards the atomisation of communities. Another way of asking a related question is whether there is such a thing as specifically American, European or Asian values. In response to this question, some students listed the following values as specifically European and thus common to different countries and cultures in Europe:
  i.   Greek philosophy and politics
  ii.   Roman law

iii. Christianity and its more 'active' view of life (as opposed to a more 'passive' account in oriental religions)
iv. individualism and diversity
v. freedom (French Revolution)
vi. the ideal of teacher (rather than that of master in the oriental culture) – a figure of authority which is contested, not blindly obeyed
vii. respect for tradition (difference with the USA)
viii. desire for unity
ix. wealth and power, which have contributed to a sense of Western and European superiority, even supremacy

Other students disputed the claim that Europe has any common values and instead spoke of European responsibility for some of the worst crimes in world history. Values are changed according to needs, and attempts to create common artificial cultures have tended to end in disaster, e.g. the experience of Yugoslavia. Here A. Clesse interjected a question about the NATO bombing of Serbia and the impact on the psychological fabric of the Serbian nation. Are Serbs characterised by cynicism and resignation? After the loss of the rest of Yugoslavia, Montenegro and probably Kosovo, is Voivodina next? Do not Serbia and the Serbs lack any stable worldview, not unlike other countries that have experienced back-stabbing? Some students argued that a loser's mentality has been created in Serbia, in the wake of three military defeats; after all that, democracy was introduced, but society is still being cheated by domestic elites and intrusive foreigners.

V. European Citizens but No European Demos? Must the European Union Become More Democratic? Can it?

The final part of the seminar focused on the question of demos. A. Clesse explained that ethos and demos are closely connected because the preservation of old traditional values or the adoption of new ones depends to a large extent on the people. Perhaps the most fundamental question is when the governing elites should consult the people, how and about which issues. In turn, this raises questions about the very nature and functioning of democracy, e.g. the Swiss model seems to rely on enlightened people, but what happens if people become increasingly conservative, reactionary, inward-looking and narrow-minded, influenced by demagoguery, not just in Switzerland but also in Denmark, Sweden, all former bastions of tolerance? Is a selective approach to holding referenda conceptually coherent and morally defensible? Is there not a degree of hypocrisy involved, especially when a referendum on a new EU treaty is turned into a referendum on the government in power? Has not a certain discourse on the EU's 'democratic deficit' reinforced populism?

Before focusing on the EU, A. Clesse made some more general remarks. First, there are global trends such as the growing polarisation between the very poor and the obscenely rich – the former barely surviving in slums outside the city centres of cities like Mumbai, Calcutta or Nairobi, whereas the latter live in so-called gated communities and do not know anything about the hardship and daily humiliation of ordinary people. In this, the rich are no different from a number of countries that practice *de facto* apartheid, e.g. the wall between Israel and Palestine and the fence and barbed wire on the border between the USA and Mexico. Second, the last few decades have seen a sharp change compared with the immediate post-war period.

Consociational democracy allowed peaceful religious co-existence, e.g. in the Netherlands, but this was followed by a cultural revolution in the 1960s and the rapid secularisation, all against the background of a terrible colonial legacy. The speed of social change contrasts with the slow evolution of mentalities – or even a certain regression, from liberalism to conservatism. In short, the ruling elites are out of touch with the reality of ethnic and religious minorities and they tend to reflect the worst instincts of their own populations such as supremacism and racism.

More specifically with reference to Europe, A. Clesse spoke about the decline of three distinct European political traditions: first, Euro-Communism; second, Christian Democracy (under different labels); third, the social democrats. In their place, Europe has seen the emergence of a right-wing conservative consensus masquerading as centrism and the rise of the so-called political extremes – the revolutionary anti-capitalist left and the fascist racist right. The other recent change has been the appearance and spread of the ecological movement, starting in the Netherlands. What has remained more or less stable is the liberal tradition and its emphasis on liberty, but the freedoms of the population have recently been undermined by virtually all political parties in Europe, in the name of defending national security and fighting the so-called 'global war on terror'. In the context of an enlarging EU, three questions arise: how does Central and Eastern Europe fit into this 'classical' political scheme? What is the influence of EU membership on domestic politics? What is the impact of the new members on the political direction of the EU?

A. Clesse then went on to argue that the EU requires profound constitutional and institutional changes if it is to become a genuinely democratic union where people can participate in the political process. First, he criticised the Commission for excessive harmonisation, standardisation and centralisation. Under the pretence of a discourse on liberty, the Commission is taking away essential freedoms from the people on a daily basis – with new technologies and an expanding propaganda machine. The growing climate of fear marks the confluence of left- and right-wing tendencies to concentrate power in the hands of a self-appointed small elite and to encroach on the freedom of the populace. As a result, it is imperative to eliminate the technocratic bias of Commission and its undemocratic stifling of the dynamic of other actors. In its stead, bureaucratic and political power must be diluted and the EU should perhaps adopt a bicameral system: the EP would represent the people and a newly created Senate the peoples. This system is both more coherent and more legitimate because it would give a voice to a number of weaker or more peripheral countries, small countries in general and the new members in particular that are not as privileged as, say, Luxembourg. Beyond this major change, other key challenges include how to 'Europeanise' not just politics but also the economy, including companies, in terms of mentality and composition and how to improve the 'representativeness' of institutions, in terms of minorities – ethnic, religious and other? What about gender equality or even parity?

The issue of gender equality and parity triggered a long and heated discussion on 'male' and 'female' values and the cultural consequences of feminism in Europe and the West. A. Clesse raised a number of conceptual and practical hypotheses. Can feminism be described as the neutralisation or homogenisation of the sexes? Is there perhaps a positive correlation between sexual differentiation and the level of civilisation? Is the West currently seeing the gradual erasure and destruction of sexual differentiation (by enforcing cultural sameness in the name of legal equality)? If so, is the West experiencing something like the 're-primitivisation' of

culture? If this trend continues, might gender become an obsolete category reminiscent of the past?

These initial reflections led to a heated debate. Quite a few students argued that values are – or should be – universal. The challenge for all societies is to combine the universality of values and the specificity of roles and 'functions', e.g. child-bearing, etc. Others said that ongoing discrimination requires more equality and that women need more protection from rape and honour killings. Feminism asserts the rights and equality of women; it does not call for the uniformisation of both genders.

G.M. Ambrosi appealed to the work of Count Coudenhove-Kalergi who argued that the revolution of *liberté* ended up in the *Terreur* of the French Revolutionaries and that the revolution of *égalité* ended up in the liquidation of dissidents under the Bolsheviks. Thus we need a third kind of revolution, that of *fraternité*. Coudenhove-Kalergi called for a revolution of brotherhood and a stronger female element in politics. According to G.M. Ambrosi, his analysis seems to be borne out by a growing body of research in anthropology and ancient history which suggests that matriarchal structures and matrilineal elements had a much greater impact on the evolution and development of mankind than hitherto presupposed – societies have been ruled not just in hierarchical but also in communal ways, especially in agricultural cultivation by women. Thus civilisation can progress and be saved from regression by strengthening the role of women.

A. Clesse went further than in his earlier remarks, saying that the feminism of the late 1960s is much more dangerous than hitherto supposed. The West is now suffering a veritable social and cultural crisis, e.g. in Germany where there are fewer marriages, fewer children, more divorce, more single mother households, more confusion, disarray, puzzlement and malaise in the relations between men and women than at any point in modern and contemporary history. Frequently, when men take on the traditional roles of women such as child-raising and domestic work, they are not respected but instead despised. Are there not specifically male or female values and, if so, should or will they converge into general, unspecific and non-distinct 'gender' values? Moreover, is it so clear that respect for women is really absent from most non-Western societies and cultures, including Islam? Is it not rather the case that femininity is in decline in Western cultures but has been preserved elsewhere? Are not Westerners deluding themselves in wanting to extend their decadent culture to other parts of the world, thinking that it will promote freedom and happiness, when in reality it causes much economic misery and even more cultural tyranny? Are not Brussels and the EU bureaucracy part of a drive to make all societies the same, under the pretence of equality?

Again, several students disagreed, saying that male-dominated societies are always based on hierarchy and conflict and that the EU should not interfere in these debates. The reason given was that gender values are more related to society, whereas the EU is a political unity and should be limited to political values. If gender values were a competence of the EU, then this would signify that the Union already is a demos. Some students also asked whether women might be genetically predisposed for certain jobs but not for others and whether the EU should in fact discourage women from certain professions and activities that are seen to be predominantly male.

A. Clesse renewed his critique of feminism and contemporary Western culture, arguing that the values which are currently promoted represent a tendency towards androgeneity and the erasure of sexual difference. For example, fierce economic competition makes working women more aggressive and changes their voices, demeanour, etc. When women take on male jobs, the shape of their bodies can change so radically that they lose their femininity and become more like men, just as men become increasingly effeminate and lose their distinctness too. There is a lot of evidence to suggest that in the USA and elsewhere in the West, body shapes are changing – directly as a result of diet, (lack of) role models, work and different types of sport (or lack of exercise). So what the West is seeing is a growing trend towards androgenous human beings. A phenomenon that is at present ill-understood is that female bodies are extremely malleable and graciousness is something absolutely unique to women that exists exclusively in sophisticated women. The same is true for what the French call *pudeur* – a certain sort of shame, with a connotation of modesty and a sense of innocence. Of course, traditional societies do not always permit women to become sophisticated because they involve hard manual labour – but does that warrant the imposition of modern western standards? A related question is whether it is worth preserving or necessary giving up chivalry vis-à-vis women? Is it not women who ensure the decency of societies?

Following this discussion, A. Clesse concluded the third part on ethos by drawing attention to the intrusion and invasiveness of the state which interferes in virtually all areas of life and opens up all spheres to surveillance and control. The spectre of a 'brave new world' (as described in the eponymous book by Aldous Huxley, written in 1932) has perhaps never been truer than now. In addition to the bureaucratic state and the rampant free market, the West is also suffering from a lack of moral reference points (*repères moraux*). This is evinced by shocking statistics and descriptions of crimes committed by marauding youth gangs who destroy, rape and kill for no reason other than the sheer thrill and 'kick' they may get out of it – this sort of mindless violence is devoid of any motives and its perpetrators are often completely unaware of any moral standards and the transgression of limits (violence, killings, binge drinking). If this is true, then the challenge is not just a matter of EU or national competence but a wholesale rethink of the foundations and finalities of European societies. What is needed is a serious and substantive debate about the root causes of the current cultural and moral crisis.

Concluding remarks

In conclusion of the seminar, A. Clesse said that the EU is once more at a crossroads and that it might already be too late to prevent the demise of the European project. It seems that the centrifugal forces of disintegration are stronger than the centripetal forces of integration, creating a constellation with a core and a periphery, not in a geographical but in a geopolitical sense, with some more integrated than others. In the absence of any consensus about the causes and consequences of this predicament, it appears that the Union as a whole is constitutively unable to define a telos. With 27 member-states and other candidate countries, talk of a common telos, ethos and demos is hopelessly naïve at best, and outright counter-productive at worst. As an organisation, the EU and its member-states are likely to exist for some time to come, but as a political union based on substantive ethical ideals shared by a unified demos in pursuit of a common telos, the prospect is bleak.

Adrian Pabst
Research Fellow, LIEIS

Appendix I

Report by the Working Group on Telos

50 years have passed since an entity was created in Europe with the purpose of ensuring that one of the biggest tragedies that ever hit Europe, the Second World War, would not repeat itself. The European Coal and Steel Community marked the beginning of an endeavour that has since taken new meanings and dimensions, as well new shapes (the European Economic Community, the European Union). However, it is safe to say that these transformations have taken place without a clear sense of where they would take the Union; security, economic prosperity, and political integration, have generally been used as goals whenever the situation that requires their use arises, without being integrated into something resembling a *telos*.

We, the working group on *telos*, feel that an integral part of a coherent European Union is the existence of such a *telos*. In the six questions that we have tackled during the working group sessions we have attempted to define if the *telos* currently exists or not, if it should exist or not, the possible shape and evolution of it, and its relation to such aspects of the Union as the enlargement process and security. Although in some moments the only full agreement that could be reached was on the point that disagreement would continue, the result has been a common set of ideas regarding a mission for Europe and its future generations.

Here is the list of questions, followed by the output of the discussions.

1. Should the European Union have a *telos* or not? Can one formulate a content of the EU's *telos*?
2. How can we define *telos* as such and its nature? Is *telos* static or dynamic?
3. Who decides upon the EU's *telos*?
4. Is the EU's *telos* supposed to incorporate the whole of Europe?
5. How does EU enlargement affect its *telos*?
6. How do the security issues affect the Union's *telos* of the European Union?

There can be no perfect agreement on whether a *telos* should exist for the EU or for the content of such a *telos*; strong arguments can be brought either for or against the idea, and most of these are directly connected to values that are deeply ingrained in the human being. That is why agreement is extremely difficult to prevail in such a discussion, whether it is carried out by 7 students or by 25 or 27 countries. In the end, we believe the most important thing is for the discussion to continue, regardless of the lack of finality of it: in the words of Hermann Hesse, "To bring the possible into existence, the impossible has to be attempted again and again". While the working group has agreed upon the necessity for such a *telos*, its content has been harder to grasp. We believe that an entity as complex as the EU needs a sense of where it *is* heading and where it *should* be heading; otherwise, it is simply advancing blindfolded and reacting to a variety of problems that appear instead of anticipating them.

Goals can be quite peculiar: at the same time, they have the power to facilitate collective action by rallying interests around them, but also to limit said action. By naming a goal, one has a clear view of where one is heading (and is thus able to devote all his energies to reach that point), but at the same time is defining a clear point where he must stop. In the opinion of this working group the EU must not stop. It does not need goals, but a *telos*: i.e. a set of

objectives for which an entity aims and which define its purpose. In the case of the EU, this includes a cluster of "ultimate goals", for which the former goals are of a purely instrumental nature (are desirable only to the extent to which they further our steps toward the achievement of the *telos*). These should be both general enough so as to allow future generations to adequately give them new meanings, and specific enough so as to direct action toward a point.

Some examples of "ultimate goals" that could be part of the *telos* would be: democracy, promotion of human rights, greater prosperity, personal security, equality, liberty, tolerance, diversity etc. These are both static and dynamic in nature: their name does not change, but their meaning certainly does (the example of democracy is worth mentioning because originally it referred to the "rule of the mob", e.g. "politeia" in Aristotle, and then "rule of the people", but for some also "rule by the elites", e.g. Joseph Schumpeter). The same point is true for the notion of liberty and equality. The conception of what is perfect is changing at the same time as the entity for which that conception applies. The specific goals are changing in time as well: e.g. to reach the *telos* of equality there is political, social, economic, and gender equality that one has to address, each of them at its own time.

Another matter that must be mentioned is the way in which the instrumental goals are defined and modified. The prevailing opinion seems to advocate an approach based on accidentalism, reacting to new developments in society and adjusting the instrumental goals as a response to these new changes and the new issues that they raise. Another approach, which could be defined as pragmatic, would seem to transmit that it is inefficient and unfeasible to act on a case-by-case basis; it would be preferable to act in a proactive manner and shape reality and events according to a plan to change society.

The discussion could not be considered complete without analyzing who is deciding on a *telos* and how this is done. While the democratic ideal demands that the demos decide on a *telos*, the constraints of reality show that it is very difficult to demand this from an electorate that is fairly apathetic regarding the EU. Not only is a demos hard to grasp (50% + 1 of all European citizens?), but also believing that more than 200 million people would agree on a set of common goals is quite a stretch of the imagination. Ordinary members of the demos do not have the time or the will to be informed regarding the EU in order for them to deliberate effectively on the definition of a *telos*.

We are forced to view things through a realist lens: while the telos *should* be defined by the demos, we believe that, in the end, it *will* not be defined by it. The lead role will be played by political elites at the European level as well as by political activists (NGOs, representatives of the citizens etc.), who will provide such a *telos*; all that the demos is required to do is to express a preference for one of the alternatives offered by the elites. While this is certainly less than what is demanded by the democratic ideal (after all, the citizens are giving up some of their power, and are content only to choose from what is given to them), it is nonetheless realistic.

In this matter, disagreement has been particularly persistent. Two groups formed, advocating opposed points of view: one considers that new values are formed through interaction between a European citizenry. It is critical for such a citizenry to exist first; in the absence of it, we have an imposition of ideas from Brussels, which tends to alienate the people from the central institutions of the EU, and ultimately defeat one of the components of the *telos*:

togetherness, solidarity, a sense of community. In this perspective, *telos* might be considered a "Grand Narrative": a "desirable future" towards the attainment of which people direct their creative efforts and their energies. However, this image is permanently changed and reconstructed by their intense interactions. The other point of view supports the view that political elites offer elements of a *telos* to the citizens around whom they can rally, and thus *create* a citizenry: the "top-down" approach.

The enlargement of the EU poses difficult problems for the manner in which the *telos* is defined. Even with a *telos* that is fairly broad, new nations will still be forced to accept a set of "ultimate goals" that they did not have a chance to vote on or express an opinion upon. Analyzing this but also other issues, the group has decided that enlargement *per se* cannot be considered to be part of a *telos* for the European Union; it is, however, an instrumental goal.

The reason for which we consider this to be the case is the fact that we do not believe enlargement to be an end in itself, but that it should only be pursued if it serves much higher purposes, such as ensuring security for the people of the EU or a higher degree of liberty. By integrating more countries into the EU, cooperation in tackling issues that affect the lives of EU citizens (such as environmental issues or transnational crime) can be greatly improved, and such can further the degree of security that the citizens of the EU enjoy. Another case in point is the accession of countries such as Turkey or Ukraine: although it is not probable that these countries will join the EU in the next 20 to 30 years, it is highly likely that eventually they will join. In the manner that we defined *telos*, it can never be achieved; thus, we consider that enlargement cannot be part of the *telos*.

The enlargement of the EU will surely affect the meaning of the *telos* as well as its breadth. New members will demand a chance to express their vision on a possible *telos*; at the same time they will attempt integration into the existing EU environment and, as such, work toward the common *telos*. The process thus leads to new meanings that are assigned to it.

As was mentioned, the *telos*, in its ideal form, remains the same. However, new meanings can be assigned to old ideas with the accession of new countries such as Turkey, Morocco, or Ukraine: e.g., the meaning of security or defence changes once the borders of the EU move very close to the Middle East.

Another question that was raised during the sessions was the extent to which issues relating to security are relevant for the *telos* of the European Union. To this question the working group's output is that security issues affect the security component of the *telos* of the EU. Defence issues are included in the security component of the *telos*. To address the latter as a wider problem is also to deal with the former. On the other hand, when speaking about the dynamic of security we refer to the new security issues of the globalised world, such as environmental disasters, or terrorism. The moment at which the meaning of security changes for the EU is when the security component of the *telos* gains this new meaning. The example that is given above refers to such a "paradigm shift" in the meaning of security, triggered by events such as 9/11 and the Madrid bombings; nowadays, the security component of the *telos* cannot be conceived without this adequate protection from terrorist threats (as vaguely as they may be defined).

As we have mentioned previously, on a series of issues agreement could not be reached despite our best efforts and repeated attempts. However, we do not consider that the argument is weaker because of it. Instead, it can be argued that it is richer for it: different possible alternatives were offered and the debate has caught on new meanings and new avenues of inquiry. An important point was that an agreement was reached on a vital matter: whether the EU should have a *telos* or not and how that would look like (general, unattainable in practice, static and yet dynamic etc.). While the attempt to define how the *telos* would change (top-down versus bottom-up approach) has been met with less success, we consider it important that the alternatives have been spelled out clearly. What we consider important is not a possible finality for the discussion, or a definite consensus amongst ourselves, but the fact that the discussion has been furthered by the presentation of our ideas and that it has not been allowed to end. After all, the abrupt end of such a discussion about a *telos* for the EU will surely spell out the end for the EU itself.

Constantin Manuel Bosanceanu
Irina Bujder
Maria Manuela Chican
Anca Simona Ciotlaus
Ivan Delibasic
Fran Kauzlaric
Gloria Stefanecu

Appendix II

Report by the Working Group on Ethos

1. DEFINITION - WHAT DOES ETHOS MEAN?

During the discussions the representatives of the group tried to point out certain elements of ethos as it is perceived at an individual level or at a collective level, in the hope of defining this concept. The approaches were trying to express the content of ethos, its formation, its results, its functioning, generating interesting debates. Some of the definitions were more close to a genesis type, some approached a *genus proximus and specific difference* alternative (underlining the importance of *values* and the long-term formation, the ability to bind people together, the capacity of being generally accepted).

Following the debates, the group came up with the following definition of ethos: ethos is a generally accepted set of formal and informal values and characteristics established in a long period of time, able to shape the expectations and justify the behaviour of a community of individuals and state entities.

2. ATTRIBUTES – WHAT IS ETHOS LIKE?

In the process of finding a more accurate understanding of ethos, a number of attributes of the concept proved to be of interest in the opinion of the members of the group, such as:
- continuous and flexible;
- long-term based;
- generally accepted;

2.1. Continuous and flexible

Ethos, since its formation, changes over time, responding to the societal and political needs. Ethos manages to perpetually reinvent itself by means of reinvigorating its elements of content. For example, in a 1971 article, Ronald Inglehart referred to a silent revolution consisting in a shift from material values to post-material values (world peace, care for the environment). In his opinion, this shift was caused by a period of economic well-being in which a new generation/cohort was socialised.

2.2. Long-term based

Ethos is operational over a long period of time necessary for its creation, understanding, promotion and actual implementation.

2.3. Generally accepted

Ethos will be able to exercise its functions once it has been embedded into the collective conscience. Jürgen Habermas proposed the theory of communicative action as a way by which norms are accepted and included in the public conscience. In the light of his theory, the group concluded that in the sensitive area of religious beliefs, EU should do no more than building a neutral framework that would enable and encourage a trialogue (Christianity, Islam and Jewish religion) of religions.

3. CONTENT - WHAT IS ETHOS REALLY ABOUT?

Searching for the elements of ethos, the group tried to set some boundaries to whatever ethos is really represented by. Its conclusions are that ethos can never be limited to a single form of concepts and in fact can never be limited at all. There are multiple forms that shape the content of ethos.

3.1. Informal expressions (non-codified): Greek philosophy, Roman law, religion (as Friedrich Nietzsche pointed out), culture and morality. It is essential to note at this point that the effect of values should itself be judged over time. For example, the Enlightenment started by being considered a paradigmatic shift from dogmatic and conservative thinking towards progress and flexibility. However, following the destructive experience of the two world wars, scholars such as Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer in their book *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, stated that the instrumentalisation of rationality and the impetus of development and evolution created the opposite effects, despite the apparent optimistic feeling surrounding the Enlightenment. The group discussion highlighted the need to reflect on the values, going beyond its 'obvious' positive effect.

3.2. Formal expressions (codified):

A. Values

a. General values: respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, respect for human rights and for the rights of minorities.

b. Principles

    b.1. Principles governing international relations, such as: not resorting to the use of force, peaceful resolution of conflicts, duty to cooperate, right to self determination, sovereign equality of states, fulfilment in good faith of its international obligations, right to self-defence and resisting oppression.

    b.2. Principles governing the community of law: subsidiarity and proportionality, respect for national identities, respect for human rights, flexibility, autonomy of communitarian institutions, institutional balance, of specialised legal competence.

B. Characteristics

In the light of the discussions brought nowadays at the EU level, the member-states and the Union are increasingly concerned with the distinction between values and characteristics in virtue of the possibility of opening a suspending procedure of one state's rights in the hypothesis where that state fails to comply with the former, but not with the latter. In this context, the underlined characteristics may be considered: pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and gender equality.

4. FUNCTIONS: WHAT DOES ETHOS DO?

The working group acknowledged that the practical traction of ethos resides in its functions, such as:

4.1. Legitimizing function

Ethos justifies behavioural intentions and resource-mobilisation for the attainment of community objectives. The group noted that the European legitimizing deficit can only be overcome by a common ethos. In relation to the mobilisation of resources, the discussions referred to Jürgen Habermas' concern with the engines of modernity: money, power and solidarity. Money and power have been overused, with the risk of bankrupting the vitality of European integration. Solidarity, despite its leftist dimension (or thanks to it) can constitute a reinvigorating resource in times of Euro-sclerosis. The case of the European Social Chart put forward by Jacques Delors at the end of the 1980s can prove the point made above.

4.2. Cohesive function

Ethos brings people and states together; it closes the gap between political ambitions and the will of society. The relation between states and societies is particularly important. The concept of bio-politics, defined by Michel Foucault as a continuous concern of the government for the health, demography and morality of its population, is particularly relevant in this respect. If the four fundamental freedoms that the EU created are to be exploited by its population in the area of bio-politics, it is obvious that a shift from national bio-politics to supranational bio-politics is happening, as states lose the control of its population growth and morality. This is why the group believes that a common European standard in the realm of bio-politics will be necessary in the prevention of national or regional disparities or distortions ranging from healthcare services to working conditions legislation.

4.3. Perpetuating function

Ethos is a prerequisite condition in the achievements of a scope (*telos*) and, in time, transforms a fulfilled *telos* into a new element of *ethos* (for example, democracy has been for many centuries a telos, which after being achieved in the European countries, became an ethos.)

4.4. Conditioning function

Ethos is at the same time a criterion to be used in the analysis and evaluation of the performance of a community. When it comes to the European integration process, ethos will be one of the most important standards in examining the chances and the stage of one state to accede to EU. In this respect, the EU factors are trying to set out new standards for the states

that want to accede to the EU, by developing the well-known and applied criteria so far, codifying and referring to the European values**.**

4.5. Descriptive function

The presence of ethos in a community is indicative of a certain level of social and economic development of a given community.

5. DYNAMICS – HOW DOES IT LIVE?

The question about where ethos is coming from was a challenging discussion practically connected to the discussions on its elements, but how is it better received and perceived by the people and how is its infringement sanctioned were two more topics that the group tried to answer, resulting in the following:

5.1. Formation and crystallisation

Ethos springs from three sources: religion, morality and law. Depending on the source, ethos has been crystallised in different forms of religious practice, moral conduct, but most recent and tangible one is the crystallisation in the form of law. *Nemine censetur ignorare legem* or nobody can invoke not knowing the law, the Romans used to say, by law understanding also the moral and the religious norms. The laws became in time the best known form of ethos. The group intended to highlight the similarity between the evolution of values and the evolution of legitimacy, as theorised by Max Weber. The three types of legitimacy (charismatic, traditional and legal) established by Weber go together with the three categories of values to which leaders respond.

5.2. Future

Ethos is *per se* a telos sometimes and so the telos becomes the ethos. The future of ethos resides in the accuracy of the telos and the capacity of fulfilling it.

5.3. Sanctioning

Compliance with ethos is being controlled and sanctioned at national level and at international level, usually by specialised institutions in control, among which people usually turn to national and international courts (European Court of Justice, European Court of Human Rights, The Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, International Criminal Court and others). The EU has also several means of sanctioning the states that do not respect its ethos going until the possibility of suspending one state's right to vote inside the EU.

6. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION – HOW DOES INTEGRATION AFFECT ETHOS?

In the view of the theoretical analysis of the process of adaptation made by Jean Piaget, the group concluded that there are two simultaneous sub-processes at work in the European institutions and in its member-states. European integration imposes the processes of assimilation and accommodation for the above mentioned actors.

6.1. Assimilation

Member-states undergo a process of assimilating the European ethos by adopting the *acquis communautaire* which has been established according to the community method (for pillar I) and to the intergovernmental method (for pillars II and III), depending on a specific moment of European integration. For example, in the process of enlargement, an applicant state must start by signing an association treaty with the European Union, then it has to open

negotiations and, after a reasonable period of time for both parties, the ethos of the EU is being implemented into national ethos, then that state will sign an accession treaty with the EU. After this stage, a period of crystallisation of the European ethos at the national level will begin.

6.2. Accommodation

The EU undergoes a process of accommodating the ethos of a new member-state by providing a large enough framework characterised by benevolent neutrality to national values. These processes are also relevant for the (re-)formation of national and European identities. In this respect, the group expects the EU to evolve in the direction of valuing Martin Heidegger's notion of *Dasein* – open project – (the single, highest stage of neutrality which allows individual entities to adopt, change and invent a multitude of identities).

7. PERSPECTIVES OF ETHOS IN THE EU – WHERE TO?

Bearing in mind that the future of ethos, especially in the perspective of an increased number of countries wanting to join the EU, is given by the goals that the EU sets for itself, the group has underlined a number of key directions. These directions are also some of the preoccupations stressed out at the EU's level in the discussion on the alteration of the main treaties governing this organisation:

- ➢ The strengthening of the importance of values in the process of accession to the EU.
- ➢ Ethos may help the EU in defining a coherent neighbouring policy that the EU does not have so far.
- ➢ Ethos may provide the basis for fulfilling the democracy deficit at the European level by reinforcing the democratic equality of all citizens and representative democracy and by providing a participative democracy of citizens in the context of legislating; the sensitive topic of democracy at the EU level has been given a deeper discussion; in the light of Pierre Rosanvallon's thesis exposed in his book *La contre-démocratie: La politique à l'âge de la défiance*, he believes that what is apparently disruptive, negative values (public distrust towards governments, perpetual suspicion and anger against governments) is actually the ethos of a new democracy which is against the mainstream understanding of democracy. This counter-democracy is said to evolve either towards populism – a democracy in which public distrust and investigation are intensively used to the point of making governments fearful and cautious in its functions – or towards what the French author names *apolitique* – civic disengagement. In order for the EU to avoid these undesirable extremes, it must work to forge an ethos strong enough to resist the pressures coming from the above mentioned extremes. It can only do so by reforming its institutions along democratic lines, its procedures along more transparent ways. These reforms are obvious objectives for the European Union, and, more importantly, they were brought about by the danger of having a fragmented ethos. A. Appadurai presented a worst-case scenario for a fragmented society. In his *Geometry of Anger, Fear of Small Numbers*, he highlights the danger of having a society fragmented and organised in the manner of terrorist cells which would only interact only with those who share their values. This is a danger that the EU should be aware of and work to avoid it.
- ➢ Based on a common ETHOS, new needs arise to define and respond to challenges in areas such as asylum policy or bioengineering.

8.   CONCLUSIONS

The group concluded on the importance and the vitality of ethos for the future of the EU, stressing that:

➢ Ethos is the 'liaison' between the demos and the telos. A potential demos will need a common ethos to achieve a higher telos.

➢ Ethos is the soul of one community holding together the body (the demos) and its expectations.

➢ Ethos is the engine of a community putting resources together in order to achieve certain objectives.

➢ Ethos will be the future of the EU and the main criteria for its enlargement

Coordinator: Ovidiu Lorin Hagima
Rapporteur: Petrut Alexandru
Members: Diana Andreea Gheorghila, Stela Stamatova, Cristian Rudolf and Claudiu Sergiu Calin

Appendix III

Report by the Working Group on Demos

1. The concept of demos
2. The democratic deficit
3. Elections: the demos' power is also its weakness
4. The future of the demos
5. Solutions to reduce the democratic deficit
6. A theory regarding the inexistence of a democratic deficit in the EU

1. The concept of demos

Demos comes from a Greek word. It means citizen participation in democratic issues such as elections and active life to address their daily concerns within or not a political society. In order to have a European demos, a common identity with common goals should exist. Is the European identity strong enough to present itself as a unitary bloc as one with common values, ideals or ideas?

Should the demos decide on European affairs issues? "The people are stupid". As non-academic as this might sound, it can be applied to the concept of not only European demos but also national one: a democracy where everyone states his opinion or decides on all matters is an inefficient one. Pro-referendum speakers should also take into consideration the simple fact of feasibility on this matter: low turnouts, lack of information or huge costs (from the tax-payers budget) for an almost unlimited number of referenda.

2. The democratic deficit

As main issue in the debate regarding the demos of the EU, the democratic deficit represents a highly important aspect in the future of the European Union. What does it mean? Does it mean anything? Does it even exist? The democratic deficit can be defined as the limited ability of citizens to influence the workings of the main EU institutions. In what regards the accountability of EU institutions to the peoples of Europe, the EU institutions are unaccountable directly. Constructed without any accountability system, the European integration process was based on the so called tacit support or permissive consensus. As the crisis of the Maastricht Treaty and the Constitutional Treaty showed, this permissive consensus withered away. Also, as direct representatives of the people in the EU system, the European Parliament has limited power in many aspects. Yet, in the last 20 years, the powers of the European Parliament have increased substantially from a consultative role to a co-decision role with the European Council. Therefore, the powers of representation and accountability of the demos have increased, alongside with the EU integration process.

In what regards the other European institution that is significant in the legislative process of the EU, the European Commission, it can be considered non-democratic? Yet, what should be kept in mind when making such a statement is the fact that the members of the Commission are approved by the European Parliament, the directly elected body of the EU.

Another aspect to be debated in the future is the effect that the enlargement had on the European political system. Therefore, the question arising is whether a larger Europe requires more democracy? We argue that either with 10 or 27 countries the issue of democratic deficit

exists. What needs to be done is not more democracy but a better decision-making system that produces fewer blockages.

There are two perspectives on the democratic deficit: institutional and sociological. The institutional perspective: from this perspective, the democratic deficit stems from the lack of direct accountability of the EU institutions. The sociological perspective states that the absence or little importance of demos is a barrier in creating a democratic EU.

3. Elections: the demos' power is also its weakness

The main tool that the demos has in any given democratic system is electing representatives to form the decision-making body. Regarding the EU, one can argue that there are two perspectives on the demos, in what regards election results: a positive and a negative one. The positive one comes from the fact that the two main decision-making bodies of the EU are elected by the European citizens. The Parliament is directly elected, and in what regards the Council, this is indirectly elected by the citizens of each individual state.

The negative aspect comes from the fact that, although crucial in the workings of the European democracy, elections do not receive from the citizens the importance they deserve. Low turnout rates at European elections and lack of information, alongside with low interest in European affairs, leads to a negative aspect of elections. More and more anti-European parties and representatives appear in the European Parliament, and significant changes in the Council's structure affect the workings of these institutions.

Another weakness of elections in the EU comes from national elections. Having local and/or parliamentary/presidential elections in the EU states every 4-5 months leads to an inconsistency of the European Council. Despite the trend for a European common ideology (centre-right), the frequent change of heads of states or government in the Council's system leads to drawbacks and blockage, in a significant number of cases. The Council's inconsistency is connected with two types of relations: the personal, individual one between decision-makers, and the second one concerning possible changes in ideology and ideas that each decision-maker has. Considered a team, the European Council lacks consistency and even a long-term vision.

4. The future of the demos

There are four possible scenarios we identified for the future of the demos of Europe, if it's going to be an European demos at all and not just flocks of sheep who like to consider themselves as wolves.

The first possibility may be called inertia creeps, and refers to no sensible future improvement in the participation of citizens in the decision making process in the near future. The Union will continue to be subject to a blend of super- and intergovernamentalism, with citizen participation being only indirect and relatively low.

The second perspective is that of total apathy, derived from a lack of values, of an ethos driven by a common telos for Europe. This could be also called a Balkanisation, or 'Easternisation' of Europe, in the sense that even Westerners will lose their inborn pragmatic attitudes in favour of the mentality of subjects which has been so popular in Eastern countries all throughout history. This is in accordance to the passive attitudes Easterners have had in relation to authority.

The third scenario, and the most pessimistic one, is related to the rise of leaders of extreme right parties, supported by huge masses of people, somehow like in the 1920s and 1930s. This would mean a fall of the concept of Europe as a cultural and even social identity, not an economic one. However it is possible to have a certain unity, together with the United States, in the name of Western civilisation, if we are to use the terminology inspired by Samuel Huntington.

Last but not least, the optimistic scenario is that of a Europe having a true demos, free participation which supposes an increase of the supranational and local levels of authority confronted to the national one. This is what globalisation in itself supposes, the rise of local "nationalisms", be they in federal or unitary states, but also that of "corporations" of states in the name of the theory of development, for example Nafta, ASEAN, and why not, the EU.

Still, even with this optimistic perspective, many questions remain unanswered, mainly problems like that of abortion, euthanasia, etc. It is basically the answer to the question - who decides: the state or the super-state or the citizens, the communities forming the demos?

5. Solutions to reduce the democratic deficit

More power to the European Parliament in order for the citizens' representatives to have more saying in the decision-making process.

An increase in the quantity, quality and a long-term well established strategy regarding the rise of interest in European affairs. One of the solutions to raise this interest is represented by increasing the level of information campaigns, debates at all levels – European Commission Communication Strategy.

6. A theory regarding the inexistence of a democratic deficit in the EU

The EU is an international organisation, made up of independent states, coming together for common ideals and ideas. The decision-making bodies, the European Parliament and the European Council, are elected by the people. These are responsible in front of the people through elections. Democratic theory (Robert Dahl) states as a requirement for democracy the agenda control: members have the exclusive opportunity to decide how and what matters should be placed on the agenda. If, as stated earlier, the members of the EU are its countries, therefore the EU is democratic, because its members are setting the agenda. To state that the citizens are not involved at all in the democratic process is therefore false. They elect representatives at the EU decision-making level. What might be considered therefore as some sort of democratic deficit is the low active participation of citizens in European affairs debates and decision-making. But this is possible and not denied by any EU regulation.

Elda Bidaj
Ligia Blidaru
Zamira Pode
Diana Prisacariu
Lusine Voskanyan
Tudor Munteanu
Ciprian Stanescu